

ISLAMIC VIOLENCE IN THE XXI CENTURY

This paper will briefly deal with Islamic violence in this century, claiming that religious lethal violence does very evidently exist and is very virulent as a not accidental component of Islamism – the very contrary of what politically asserted after the November 2015 attacks to Paris by the communiqué released after the G20 summit, where the governments reaffirm that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group.

A strong correlation between Islamic fundamentalism and lethal violence exists and cannot be denied, just by not observing the facts, as the theologians did deny the theologically impossible results by Galileo, and specifically the discovery of sunspots, by simply refusing to use his devil's instrument, the helioscope, a specific variant of telescope or monocular.

In this paper

- a) lethal violence specifically used within religious jihad will be quantified (as the most relevant component in this century of any terroristic use of lethal violence) to demonstrate this correlation;
- b) a list of incidents with 100 or more victims, by Islamic or not Islamic terrorism will be tentatively added on the basis of the best available sources;
- c) a few attacks will be briefly detailed, showing some disquieting evolution of Islamic terrorism after 9/11, its legacy being not terrorism by aircrafts, but multiple attacks as war acts against civilian population, more precisely barbarian war acts contrary to every and any convention on military warfare;
- d) a photographic documentation will be introduced, documenting with specific images, not always available and often not used by newspapers, recycling classical icons in front of a constant drip of the same attacks;
- e) with a short discussion of places where religious lethal violence, and even more intra-religious lethal violence, is already an usual part of no more so civil life.

As we already did elsewhere, we will stress the need to judge Islamic religious violence not only when it irregularly reaches the Western world, but as a *normal* toll of violent death in macro-regions with significant Islamic population – we cannot understand a phenomenon by studying only a secondary component, its Western, for us relevant spill out, and not its global disquieting nature. On this account, the wave of increased Islamic terrorism that we have perceived in 2015 was only the assessment of a new level already reached in 2014¹ – at about 250% the average value in the period 2001-2014.

We did not discuss, as originally intended, the most relevant Islamic organizations, whose specific toll of death we quantified (p. 204) – but we hope to publish next year papers by other scholars on each of them.

1. *Quantification of lethal violence*

For a quantitative assessment of Islamic violence we have used different sources, but mainly the June 2015 release of the Global Terrorism database, not only for its excellent quality, but because it is not primarily concentrated on Islam, but gives systematic data on world-wide terrorist incidents since 1970: it allows also to compare Islamic terrorism with

¹ In our *Islamic violence 2014* we largely underestimated the toll of death: *over 1200* is an unintentional epic understatement for what we now, using GTD data, would rephrase as *over 15545 but probably 21410* (see below, n. 20).

other forms of the same phenomenon and to calculate so both Islamic share of religious lethal violence and its share of overall terrorist violence.

The Global Terrorism database (= GTD) has already collected very precise data on more than 140000 terrorist attacks – and is standing collecting further data, with a reasonable delay on facts. The sample we use, published in June 2015, cover the period 1970-2014. No events are yet registered for 2015, the collection of data for 2014 (16818 vs. 11999 incidents of the preceding year) should be complete or reasonably complete. Basically GTD collects three set of data on each incident, people killed, people wounded, and damages, has its own formula to give an overall value to each incident and on this basis to each country (as a victim of terrorism) in order to build its own yearly rank. We are however only interested in lethal violence, which occurred only in less than half of all incidents (60426/141966 in the period 1970-2014 and 33316/70370 in period 2001-2014). GTD counts, according to its own rigorous standards of using the sources², the total number of fatalities, *perpetrators included*, and the number of fatalities among attackers. We are only interested in victims, whose number is obviously the difference among the two data in GTD.

GTD to establish the terrorist nature of an incident (counting analytically an incident as a single event, eventually with two different phases, but at the same time and place³) requires all three characteristics listed under number 1-3 and at least two of those listed under number 4-6:

1. the incident must be intentional;
2. the incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence -including property violence, as well as violence against people;
3. the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors;
4. the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
5. there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims;
6. the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.⁴

It may also be distinguished between incidents which are of terrorist nature in a stronger or weaker nature, i.e. that meet only two or all the last three criteria. The data already given and based on the inclusive calculation are only slightly reduced by this selective calculation (50054/123190 in the period 1970-2014 and 29137/62149 in the period 2001-2014), which we will also use only in a sporadic way. There is however another distinction in the database between sure and doubtful terroristic acts, i.e. acts that although presenting two or three of the additional criteria may have an alternative explication (insurgency/guerilla action; other crime type; inter/intra-group conflict; lack of intentionality; post-2012, state actors), systematically recorded after 1997. By adding this further condition, that no doubts exist on the terroristic nature of the act, the number of relevant incidents shrinks to 44025 in the period 1970-2014 and 28106 in the period 2001-2014. This strict calculation (so labelled to distinguish it from the selective already mentioned) will be used consistently throughout this paper and even more than the inclusive one.

Geographically each incident is linked to the country where it happened, but countries are grouped into geographical regions: strangely enough, their classification in the code-

² To be found in *Global terrorism database codebook*, August 2014, p. 46-47.

³ “Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city. This represents four incidents”: *GTD codebook*, 9. Cumulative data on number of victims are in these cases evenly distributed among the incidents.

⁴ “That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants)”: *GTD Codebook*, p. 8.

book does not correspond in one single, but relevant case to their real classification in the database, where Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia form with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Central Asia, there is no specific group labelled Russia & the Newly Independent States, but Russia and the other European states succeeding to USSR are listed within Eastern Europe.

In the following table are given as reference values for each region the general and strict number of victims for both periods, 1970-2014 and 2001-2014.

1. *Table 1 - Victims of terrorist incidents by region and epoch*

	1970-2014		1970-2000		2001-2014	
	general	strict	general	strict	general	strict
North America	4544	4200	1381	1104	3163	3096
Central America & Caribbean	28456	7778	28380	7707	76	71
South America	27832	17772	25536	15831	2296	1941
East Asia	792	720	308	277	484	443
Southeast Asia	12714	8743	7643	4560	5071	4183
South Asia	66645	52324	26895	17432	39750	34892
Central Asia	917	627	811	548	106	79
Western Europe	6025	4647	5579	4230	446	417
Eastern Europe	5614	4502	1866	1371	3748	3131
Middle East & North Africa	81930	66072	20654	14439	61276	51633
Sub-Saharan Africa	47952	38320	22438	15808	25514	22512
Australasia & Oceania	134	69	130	66	4	3
	283555	205774	141621	83373	141934	122401

To better understand the table it must be specified that 2977 victims in strict sense were registered in North America on 9/11, leaving only 186 general and 119 strict victims for the rest of the period 2001-2014.

2. *Table 2 – Average and relative number of strict victims by region and epoch*

Strict victims per year	absolute values		per million persons	
	1970-2000	2001-2014	1970-2000	2001-2014
North America	35.6	221.14	0.087	0.539
Central America & Caribbean	248.6	5.07	3.139	0.064
South America	510.7	138.64	1.423	0.386
East Asia	8.9	31.64	0.006	0.021
Southeast Asia	147.1	298.79	0.287	0.584
South Asia	562.3	2492.29	0.404	1.791
Central Asia	17.7	5.64	0.239	0.076
Western Europe	136.5	29.79	0.346	0.076
Eastern Europe	44.2	223.64	0.131	0.663
Middle East & North Africa	465.8	3688.07	1.094	8.664
Sub-Saharan Africa	509.9	1608.00	0.705	2.224
Australasia & Oceania	2.1	0.21	0.067	0.007
	2689.5	8742.9	0.433	1.408

To better understand this table one should split the absolute value for North America 2001-2014 into two values: 2985 (2001) and 8.54 (2002-2014) and the rate per million persons into following values: 7.278 (2001) and 0.021 (2002-2014).

Lethal violence almost absent from Australasia & Oceania has practically disappeared there (sinking from 2.1 to 0.21 victims per year and from 0.067 to 0.007 per million persons). Strong death toll in Central America & Caribbean (3.139 per million persons/year) has almost completely disappeared (0.064); death toll in South America reduced by two third (1.423 to 0.386 per million persons/year) but is still significant (over 0.1 per million persons/year), while death toll in Central Asia and Western Europe reduced to 0.076, more drastically in Western Europe, East Asian values remain incredibly low, although rising from 0.006 to 0.021 per million persons/years. On the negative side the toll death increased in Eastern Europe by a factor five (from 0.131 to 0.663), in South Asia doubled (from 0.287 to 0.584).

Very critical values (over 1 per million persons/year) were reached in South Asia, with an increase by a factor four (from 0.404 to 1.791), Sub-Saharan Africa, with an increase by a factor three (from 0.705 and 2.224) and in the Middle East & North Africa with an increase by a factor eight of the third highest value, also from 1.094 to 8.664 – the relative value in this region of the toll death is six times the world average (1.408). Significantly enough the three areas with high relative toll death, over the world average, have also high quotas of Islamic population: according to 2010 Pew report, 91.2% in Middle East & North Africa, 30.9% in South Asia, 29.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It might perhaps be useful to remind that very different homicide rates are registered by UN for their 49 geographical regions⁵, with GTD Western Europe completely under 3 per 100000 persons/year (30 per million), Southern Africa probably over 30 per 100000 persons/year, Central America over 25, South America at about 22, Northern America just below 5, a world average of 6.2, Eastern Europe just below it, every region in Asia below this average, with Eastern Asia on Western European values, Northern Africa below the world average, but all other regions well over it and also over 10-15 per 100000 persons/years. More synthetically murder is still high in Americas (16.3) and Africa (12.5), with Europe, Oceania (both 3) and Asia (2.9) below the half of the world average.

For more than half of the incidents occurred 2001-2014 the perpetrators are unknown: more exactly GTD uses the term Unknown for 15862 incidents, other similar generic designations (rebels, tribesmen, other, militants, gunmen) for another group of incidents: adding a few named, but substantially unknown groups with one or two incidents each, globally responsible for 23 incidents with 105 dead persons, we have 16230 (out of 28106 i.e. 57.8%) incidents without known perpetrators, with a global toll of death of 52269 out of 122401 (42.7%). So we can establish the Islamic share of violence only on 43% of the casualties and 58% of the lethal incidents. Before evaluating synthetically the absolute level of Islamic violence, it might be interesting to calculate it analytically in every single region – and also check in some specific regions (North America and Europe) the completeness of GTD and the relevance of other forms of Islamic violence, not (often only technically) classified as terrorism.

Next to Islamic violence, religious violence by other denominations, Marxist revolution and regional/ethnic separatism have been considered as alternative explications – leaving space for other miscellaneous or no explications. Not every Muslim terrorist implies Islamic violence: secularized Muslims fighting without an Islamic agenda for Palestine are counted as separatists and so, with some more hesitation, Chechen rebels.

⁵ UN estimations are given with a wide marge of error and not in numeric, but graphic form – what makes more difficult to use them in this comparison. We quote from graphic and map in *2014 Global Homicide Book*, p. 23.

1.1. North America

In North America almost all incidents, but 9/11, in GTD were perpetrated by individuals or unknown perpetrators – with two only exceptions, Individuals tending toward savagery killing 37 people in Mexico City in 2013 and Minutemen American Defence killing 2 people in 2009. It is also better, due to the abnormal incidence of 9/11, not to speculate about any distribution of terrorist violence: even more as among unknown perpetrators are also the well-known Chechen brothers responsible for two deaths at the Boston marathon; one of them, Tamerlan, was also linked to the triple homicide in Waltham about 11 September 2011 of the three Jewish people almost decapitated in al-Qaeda's style...

Even greater divergences emerge however with other lists of Islamic violence incidents, including e.g. the Beltway sniper attacks, perpetrated by John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo between February and October 2002, by random killing 10 people in the Washington metropolitan area and 6 others elsewhere in USA, with some self identification of the leader, former member of the Nation of Islam, with Jihad and his death sentence based on the terrorist nature of at least one murder. The psychological effect of their death treats was not to underestimate.

Although not indicted on terrorism charges, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, an American convert born Carlos Leon Bledsoe, shot killing a private, on Little Rock recruiting office on 1 June 2009 to take part in the jihad – and claimed affiliation to Al-Qaeda in Yemen.⁶

Technically not prosecuted as an act of terrorism, or motivated by militant Islamic religious convictions (with a decision legally challenged by survivors and familiars of victims) the Fort Hood shooting was an act of Islamic violence, with a Muslim psychiatrist in the army going on 5 November 2009 amok against other US soldiers and killing 13 of them with Islamic motivations – and with the approval before and after the fact of the Yemen-based imam Anwar-al-Awlaki, describing him as a hero⁷.

Among incidents attributed in GTD to individuals without highlighting the Islamist connections of the perpetrator is also the 2002 Los Angeles International Airport shooting (4 July, 2 victims).

Among incidents attributed in GTD to individuals with Muslim background are Naveed Afzal Haq's killing of one Jewish woman in a hate crime in Seattle (28 July 2006) and self-styled jihadist Ali Muhammad Brown's four killings (Skyway 27/4/2014; Seattle 1/6/2014; West Orange 25/6/2014) perpetrated as *vengeance for the actions of the United States in the Middle East*. +8

Among violent attacks of not terrorist nature are:

- the killing by a Saudi religiously strict Muslim, Alayed, of a former Jewish friend, Sellouk, almost decapitated on 6/8/2003, although not technically claimed as a hate crime;
- the killing of a Jewish moviegoer in Baltimore (16 June 2006);
- the killing by an Islamic student of a scholar studying fundamentalisms, Richard Antoun (4/12/2009);

⁶ K. Goetz, *Muslim who shot soldier in Arkansas says he wanted to cause more death. Memphis man drifted to the dark side of Islamic extremism and then plotted a one-man jihad against his homeland*, Commercial Appeal 13-11-2010.

⁷ "Nidal Hasan is a hero, the fact that fighting against the U.S. army is an Islamic duty today cannot be disputed. Nidal has killed soldiers who were about to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to kill Muslims".

- the killing of a woman refusing to convert their common daughter to Islam by his Muslim ex-boyfriend in Houston (15/1/2012)⁸;
- the beheading of two Coptic immigrants by a Muslim in New Jersey (Buena Vista 7/2/2013);⁹
- the parricide by an Islamic convert killing in Ashtabula on 24/3/2013 his father outside his church at Easter and yelling “The will of Allah — this is the will of God,” either before or after the murder.¹⁰

Other crimes by Muslims usually listed may however be better interpreted as individuals running amok independently from their religious identity (Michael Julius Ford, Denver 25/6/2006) or with a secondary religious motivation (Daymond Agnew, Richmond 4/8/2013). But Alton Nolan’s beheading of a colleague (Moore 25/9/2014) under appeals to sharia after having being sacked cannot be explained away just as running amok independently of his religious fanaticism.¹¹ Honour killings (as those usually listed: Scottsville 15/4/2004; Irving 1/1/2008; 6/7/2008; Buffalo 12/2/2009; Phoenix 12/4/2009; Glendale 2/11/2009; Marquette Park 14/4/2010; Warren 30/4/2011; Port Bolivar 6/3/2014) do not belong to the Islamic violence we are studying here, even if the victims had converted to Christianity (Houston 12/11/2012).

The count of 89 killings in 47 attacks since 9/11 at the site *thereligionofpeace.com*, as seen on 14/12/2015, includes also two incidents in 2015, with a total of 19 victims. 9 victims appear in GTD as killed by individuals or (erroneously) by unknown perpetrators, and so not in our standardised evaluation of Islamic terrorism; 33 were the victims of terrorist acts technically not claimed as such, while 8 other killings were religiously motivated, independently by their being technically classified as hate crimes or not. So 50 out of 70 further killings after 9/11 listed by *thereligionofpeace.com* do really belong to the death toll of Islamic violence in the USA, conservatively estimated by excluding not specifically religious amok running of Muslims and honour killings.

The GTD image, giving only 9/11 as an Islamic terroristic attack on US soil in this century, is also far more misleading than any other data collection, as it specifically forgets the heavy impact and deep Islamic motivation of

- the Washington snipers in 2002 (16 victims);
- the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 (13 victims);
- the Boston marathon bombings in 2013;
- Ali Muhammad Brown’s killings in 2014;
- Islamic killings of 7 Jewish people in 5 different incidents.

1.2. *Western Europe*

For Western Europe we know the responsible for 309 out of 417 casualties: with only two incidents (plus Van Gogh’s assassination), i.e. Madrid on 11/3/2004 and London on 7/7/2005 they killed 244 people (79%); Basque separatists (29), splinter groups of IRA (11) or Ulster Volunteers (1) altogether 41 (13.3%).

However some other incidents are not recognized at their true value: strange doubts about the clear terrorist nature of the Frankfurt airport shooting excluded from our stand-

⁸ S. Nolan, *Devout Christian murdered by Muslim ex-boyfriend after row over converting their daughter to Islam*, Daily Mail 11-12-2012.

⁹ B. Unruh, *Muslim accused of beheading 2 Christians in U.S.*, WND 19/2/2013.

¹⁰ *‘The will of Allah’: Ohio church service turns deadly after man reportedly yells Islamic rhetoric, shoots his father*, Blaze 1-4-2013.

¹¹ L. Warren – L. Collins, *‘Sharia law is coming’: Facebook rants of fired Muslim convert store-worker who beheaded female colleague and stabbed another woman before being shot by CEO*, Daily Mail 27-9-2014.

ardized evaluation Arid Uka's killing of two US airmen on 2/3/2011. Also excluded is, for its generic classification under individual, Mohammed Merah's killing of three Muslim French soldiers in Montauban and four Jewish people (a rabbi and three children) in Toulouse¹². For the same reason is not perceived through GTD the Islamic component of the decapitation of Lee Rigby to avenge the killing of Muslims by the British armed forces perpetrated on 22 May 2013 by two British converts to Islam of Nigerian descent. Even less the Islamic responsibilities in the Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting, with GTD blatantly ignoring Mehdi Nemmouche's radical Islamism and his connection to ISIL – his motivation were not only anti-Semitic, but more specifically Islamic anti-Semitic; in any case four more Jewish people were killed by a Muslim fanatic on 24 May 2014¹³, rounding up to 8 the Jewish victims of Islamic terrorist violence in Europe, outside the two main incidents (and the only ones properly classified by GTD).

To properly assess Islamic anti-Semitic violence in Western Europe we must however also consider (without claiming to be exhaustive) Ilan Halimi's kidnapping and killing by a Muslim fundamentalist gang (Paris 21/1-13/2/2006)¹⁴ and Sebastien Salem's murder by his Islamic childhood friend Adel Amastaibou, declared legally insane, but giving a religious motivation of his crime (Paris 19-20/11/2003)¹⁵.

Curiously only one Jew, rabbi Avraham Greenbaum, was probably¹⁶ murdered in Western Europe in this century by neo-Nazis, who on the contrary targeted mainly Turkish and Islamic victims (killing ten people 2000-2007, nine in this century, in the so called Döner murders perpetrated by National Socialist Underground). In a very bizarre constellation, now German Neo-Nazis kill Muslims, while French Muslims kill Jews, the historical target of Nazi hate... Ten Jews killed by Muslims on an Islamic agenda in Western Europe are a very huge death toll – and even more if one considers the small dimensions of European Jewry after the Holocaust, with only a million Jews in the European Union (a sixth of both US Jews or Israeli Jews).

We are not able to study, at least in this context, the extent of Islamic anti-Semitic hate speech and its exaltation of *shoah*: without knowing how they are representative of Islamic attitudes toward *shoah* we have however collected some very disquieting images of Islamic intolerant propaganda, compared to which any form of Islamophobia pales and disappears, and specifically hate speech against unbelievers and Westerners¹⁷, attacks to democracy and free speech¹⁸, but above all invocation of Jewish genocide¹⁹, *the true holocaust...* already

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- ¹² Photos (nn. 127-130): www.haaretz.com/polopoly_fs/1.419534.1332154837!/image/2349077637.jpg
www.haaretz.com/polopoly_fs/1.419541!/image/467795819.jpg
static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-public/styles/story_large/public/thumbnails/image/2012/03/21/22/pg-10-victims-afp-getty.jpg
latimesblogs.latimes.com/.a/6a00d8341c630a53ef0168e9108340970c-pi
- ¹³ Photos (nn. 131-136): www.belemturktv.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/foto-1-16.jpg
cdn.static1.rtr-vesti.ru/p/xw_955474.jpg
static3.7sur7.be/static/photo/2014/18/5/4/20140527190347/media_xll_6778534.jpg
r1.lhdh.be/image/31/5384f08c3570af48fcf56431.jpg
www.vosizneias.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/h_51385987-1.jpg
www.vosizneias.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/h_51955343.jpg
- ¹⁴ M. Gurfinkiel, *Tale of torture and murder horrifies the whole of France*, New York Sun 22-2-2006.
 Photos (nn. 125-126): www.haaretz.com/polopoly_fs/1.635754.1420618617!/image/1298456414.jpg
www1.alliancefr.com/wp-content/uploads/bqimages/ilan-Halimi.jpg
- ¹⁵ B. Kline, *Two sons of France*, Jersualem Post 24-1-2010.
- ¹⁶ O. Aderet, *Germany probing if neo-Nazi gang killed Israeli rabbi in 2001*, Haaretz 14-12-2011.
- ¹⁷ Photo (n. 137): www.theaugeanstables.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/london-protest-slogans.jpg
- ¹⁸ Photos (nn. 139-140): arthuride.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/muslim-protest-against-free-speech.jpg
www.thecommentator.com/system/articles/inner_pictures/000/003/161/original/islam.jpg
- ¹⁹ Photos (nn.138; 141-142):

celebrated in an international contest in 2006, in the wake of the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy, and now again in 2015, as an answer to Western *Je suis Charlie* movement.

In any case before the 2015 attacks on Paris (and other objectives in Europe), great war-like events alternated mainly with Islamic anti-Semitic attacks, with few victims, but huge resonance, Rigby's barbaric decapitation being rather an exception, with comprehensible huge resonance.

However the very strange motivation of a significant part of Islamic murders in the West (revenge on soldiers of one's own countries for the alleged collective murders of Muslims by their homeland's army) is so well attested on both sides of the Atlantic. Traditional anti-Semitic doubts about Jewish loyalty to their homeland vs. Israel appear very laughable, when confronted with Muslims *killing* soldiers of the country whose citizen they are in order to revenge their armies' alleged activity against Muslims, mainly in peacekeeping, not war-operations.

1.3. The three most violent regions

For South Asia (the third most violent region) perpetrators are known for 22309 out of 34892 casualties (64%). 3082 (13.8%) were victims of separatists, 3138 (14.1%) of Marxists, 114 (0.5%) of other religious violence (3 people having been killed by Buddhist Bodu Bala Sena, 6 by Hindus, 3 by unspecified Christians, the rest by the National Liberation Front of Tripura) – but 15948 (71.5%) by Islamic violence. A mathematical extrapolation would give for Islamic violence in South Asia a toll death of 1.281 victims for million persons/year, slightly less than the world's average for *any* type of terrorist violence.

In diachronic perspective the total number of victims with known perpetrators in 2013 and 2014 (3062 and 3073) is five times the average number of victims 2001-2005 (between 456 in 2003 and 693 in 2005). A rapid increase (from 693 to 1486) happened in 2006 and (from 1362 to 1910) in 2008; in 2008-2011 the global death toll was between 1859 (2011) and 2056 (2009), in 2012 already 2518.

In 2008 the Islamic share of this increasing toll of death reached 66.6%, in 2011 80%, even more the following years with an azimuth in 2012 (88.4%); in 2014 was 84%.

For Sub-Saharan Africa (second most violent region) perpetrators are known for 18204 out of 22512 victims (81%): 11102 (61%) were victims of Islamic violence, 4332 (23.8%) of separatists, 2526 (13.9%) of Christian violence – either by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA, in Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic or Democratic Republic of the Congo: globally 2222 victims) or by anti-balaka militia in Central African Republic (276) or by Tarok militia (Nigeria, 6 victims).

In Uganda Lord's Resistance Army is with 568 out of 681 victims with known perpetrators (and 730 strict victims overall) the most violent actor and so is in the Democratic Republic of Congo with 993 victims (out of 1768 with known perpetrators), three times the victims of Islamic violence (331), more than twice those of the separatists (417); in Sudan with 599 victims out of 1881 with known perpetrators (and 2910 strict victims overall) comes after the separatists (1022) but before Islamic violence (260); Christian forces murdering 338 people were more violent than Islamic ones (248 victims, out of 662, with 62 by separatists and 14 uncertain) also in the Central African Republic.

A mathematical extrapolation gives for Islamic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa 1.357 victims per million persons/year, slightly less than the world's average for *any* type of terrorist violence and more than in South Asia – for African Christian violence, a worldwide unique phenomenon within Christianity, a disquieting 0.309 victims per million persons/year.

Both Islamic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and high values of violence in the same region are however very recent innovations, that took place only in the three-four last years observed: until 2006 included there was almost no Islamic violence in this region (20.6% of

only 160 victims with known perpetrators in 2005; 6.1% in 2006) and overall violence was low (780 victims with known perpetrators in 2001 being the azimuth until 2009, 1301 victims, followed however by two further years with lesser values). Islamic violence became the strongest component in 2010 (56%) to reach, still on low global values, 83% in 2011, 90.5% of 1452 victims in 2012, 83.7% and 74% in 2013 and 2014. 2014 registered however 8519 victims with known perpetrators – more than four times the victims in 2013, more than eleven times those in 2001. In Sub-Saharan Africa *Islamic violence is exploding now*.

For Middle East & North Africa, the most violent region, we know the responsible only of 20201 deaths out of 51633 (39.1%). 19312 (95.6%) casualties were provoked by Islamic violence – 370 (1.8%) by separatists, 237 (1.2%) by Marxists, 9 (0.04%) by Hebrews, the rest being not specifically classified.

A mathematical extrapolation would also give for Islamic violence in Middle East & North Africa a toll death of 8.283 victims for million persons/year, almost six times the world's average for *any* type of terrorist violence, 24 times the death toll in Western Europe at the end of the XX century, 109 times the death toll in Western Europe in this century (mostly provoked, 79%, by Islamic terrorists).

In a diachronic perspective the Islamic share of victims of known perpetrators was always very high (between 85.4% in 2002 and 98.8% in 2013, with all years but one over 88%, all but four over 90%, and a median of 95.4%). The total death toll, by known or unknown perpetrators, has however dramatically risen in two waves: from less than 1000 a year in 2001-2003, to more than 2000-3000 a year in 2004-2012 (with a peak of 4565 in 2007 and 6185 in 2008) than again to 7815 in 2013 and 11527 in 2014: more than eleven times the 2001-2003 death toll, almost 4 times the average 2004-2012 death toll (3306), more than 4 times the average 2004-2006.2009-2012 death toll (2715).

It must be noted that the average values calculated above and our mathematical extrapolations do not specifically reflect the most recent dramatic increases just mentioned: in 2014 the same mathematical extrapolations gives in South Asia 2.78 victims of Islamic violence for million persons/year, in Sub-Saharan Africa 9.24 victims of Islamic violence for million persons/year, 26.4 in North Africa & Middle East.

The current death toll (2014) in Sub-Saharan Africa is also already higher than the abnormally high average death toll in this century in North Africa & Middle East, which was however in 2014 thrice its average, abnormally high value – while in South Asia the 2014 death toll was *only* more than twice its average value in this century...

Our analysis is also based on structural values for this century, not on the 2014 peaks, which *might* however introduce a new, higher structural level of Islamic violence.²⁰

1.4. Other regions

Out of 71 strict victims in Central America & Caribbean only 6 were killed by known perpetrators: an extrapolation out of less than 10% makes little sense.

Out of 1941 strict victims in South America only 252 were killed by unknown perpetrators, 1689 by known groups: 1391 by Marxist guerrilla, 2 by separatists, the rest (296) by other groups, but mainly (227) by United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC), a Colom-

²⁰ Islamic death toll in 2015 was probably inferior to 2014, but higher than in 2013. thereligionofpeace.com counts (as of 18/1/2016) 11546 bodies in 2012, 16767 in 2013, 32262 in 2014, 27578 in 2015.

We count on the contrary 5008 strict victims of Islamic violence in 2012, 7221 in 2013 and 15545 in 2014, and from these numbers, the numbers of victims by known perpetrators and the total numbers of victims we extrapolate 8429 victims in 2012, 13767 in 2013, 21410 in 2014.

bian para-military and drug trafficking group. No Islamic or religious violence and for Marxist violence a share of 82.4%.

For East Asia only the responsible for 174 out of 443 strict victims are known. Very much depends on our decision to consider separatists rather than Islamic the Uighur separatists, accounting for 123 dead persons, 50 (28.8%) having been killed by Turkestan Islamic terrorists and only one by Tibetan separatists.

For South East Asia perpetrators are known only for 2022 out of 4183 (48.3%) of the casualties. For 431 of them (21.3%) are responsible Marxist terrorists, but almost exclusively (423) the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines; for 382 (18.9%) separatists; for 1193 (59%) Islamic violence, no other religious violence occurring.

For Central Asia perpetrators are known only for 12 out of 79 victims, ten killed by Islamic, two by separatist violence, but too few to extrapolate a solid estimation of any share.

In Eastern Europe we know the killers of 2146 out of 3131 strict victims (68.5%); 859 (40%) were the victims of Islamic violence, 1271 of separatists (664 of Chechen rebels, at the edge between Islamic and separatist violence).

In Australasia & Oceania GTD reports only two victims (out of a global number of three) by an individual, who is however Man Haron Monis, a borderline situation for his going amok with specific Muslim contents with a hostage taking in Sydney leaving two victims and a strong reaction in the whole Australia (including an unusually clear condemnation by local Muslim authorities).

1.5. Other religious violence

Religious violence by not Islamic actors occurs significantly only in sub-Saharan Africa by Christian actors (13.9%), mainly Lord's Resistance Army (2222 victims); otherwise there are only other 105 (0.5%) victims of Christian interreligious violence, all but three by the National Liberation Front of Tripura in South Asia. Christian intra-religious violence produced 7 people murdered by Protestants and 1 by Catholics in North Ireland – in 30 incidents by Oglagh na hEireann, what confirms the specific Irish Catholic modus operandi, i.e. bombings to destroy and inflict material damage killing no or few victims²¹.

Worldwide there were only 9 victims of Hebrew violence, all in the Middle East (0.04%), 3 victims of Buddhist violence in South Asia (0.01%), six of Hindu violence in the same area (0.03%).

1.6. Conclusions

With one single exception (African Christian violence, mainly by Lord's Resistance Army) Islamic violence is worldwide the *only* form of lethal religious violence, responsible for 95% of the victims (51695 out 54330) of any kind of religious violence and for 73.8% of the victims (70088) of *any* terroristic violence with known perpetrators.

12641 were murdered by Talibans or their affiliates, 11468 victims by al-Qaida or its affiliates, 8258 by ISIL, active only since 2007²², 7784 by Boko Haram, 2291 by salafists, 2053 by sunni radicals: there are also four principal actors of death in Islam (Talibans, al-Qaida, ISIL, Boko Haram) and a wide magmatic archipelago of hundreds of groups responsible for 7200 deaths – a very closed fifth actor, before the sixth and seventh elements

²¹ As a comparison these are the average numbers of victims per incident for the major terroristic organizations: 10.73 (Lord's Resistance army), 6.82 (sunnites), 5.96 (Boko Haram), 5.26 (Al Qaida), 4.41 (ISIL), 2.31 (Taliban). For IRA bombings (1970-1998) 0.59 (in 1140 incidents), for any other activity 0.7 (in 1519 incidents).

²² Had ISIL killed people with the same intensity since 2001, it would be the clear winner of this rank list, with some 14450 victims.

of this rank list. Whatever the reasons of its violence may be, the African Christian Lord's Resistance Army would place itself for its toll of death between the sixth and the seventh most violent Islamic subject or area, at about 4% of the global Islamic death toll (or 3.8% of the global religious death toll, or 3% of any terroristic death toll with known perpetrators). It must however be observed that, since the begin (2011) of an international, US led task force activity targeting Lord's Resistance Army, its lethal activity has virtually ended, with a death toll of only 4 for the period 2012-2014 according to GTD.

Curiously Boko Haram shocked the West, gained a popularity very different from its expectation and was banned mainly for a secondary action, the mass kidnapping of Christian student girls, which however well express their ideology: no Western education and even more no education at all for girls, which must only marry, or else be raped /whored. The international answer, and specifically Michelle Obama's appeal, had a greater impact against Boko Haram than years of death toll.²³ The attacks are so frequent that it is difficult to distinguish one another and the primary sources often use the same images for different episodes: in our graphic documentation we have therefore added images that could not be used to document the episodes in our hit list, many not specifically documented by images of our knowledge, and more precisely generic images from Boko Haram's videos²⁴, images of other blasts, attacks²⁵ and victims²⁶, and even of protests against them²⁷.

Yet in another perspective 376 millions Buddhists killed for religious grounds 3 people in this century (up to 2014), 0.008 per million Buddhists; 1 billion Hindu killed 6 people, 0.006 per million Hindus; at a different level 14 millions Jews killed 9 people, 0.64 per million and 2.2 billion Christians 2319, what makes 1.05 per million, if we do not, more correctly, separate African Christians from other Christians – and then, at a very different level from any other religion, 1.6 billion Muslims killed worldwide 51695 persons for religious grounds, 32.31 per million Muslims.

23 Photos (nn. 91-96): www.sbs.com.au/news/sites/sbs.com.au.news/files/boko_haram_nigeria_aap.jpg
i.huffpost.com/gen/2208950/images/o-ENLEVEMENT-NIGERIA-facebook.jpg
images.viralnova.com/000/045/561/nigerian-school-girls-002.jpg
www.newyorker.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Okeowo-Nigerian-Girls-1200.jpg
media1.s-nbcnews.com/i/newscms/2014_19/427626/140507-flotus-nigeria-girls-jms-1805_5b4ab932af8a4df4fa2c576f6354264e.jpg
qzprod.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/ap861917496456.jpg

24 Photos (nn. 97-98; 102):
edinburghint.com/insidetrack/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/140714-boko-haram-shekau-5a_7f2bcf50180bbeb700135f7e1e313a3c.jpg
thenypost.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/boko-1.jpg
static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-public/thumbnails/image/2015/04/26/14/v2-boko-haram-wide.jpg

25 Photos (nn. 99-101; 103-105; 107-108):
america.aljazeera.com/content/dam/ajam/images/articles_2014/03/bokoHaram_File_032314.jpg
koaci.com/thumbs/pixer_1000/pix_1440494436e092036_1.jpg
dailybaze.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/boko-haram.jpg
cdn.dailypost.ng/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Boko-Haram.jpg?a1f46c
s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/2014/06/05/boko-haram.jpg
1350kman.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Nigeria-Explosion.jpg
stmedia.startribune.com/images/NIGERIA_BOKO_HARAM_35336479.JPG
d1udmfvw0p7cd2.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/f-boko-b-20150717.jpg

26 Photos (nn. 106; 109):
news.lent.az/upload/images/news/2015/february/05/big/12b6b2ccfbbaeb14cbf438eccf15c750.jpg
i.onthe.io/vllkvt339t60j7p3fg.7c2c1a41.jpg

27 Photo (n. 110):
static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2015/1/12/1421064887061/d9ed0090-7db0-4750-a6eb-ef3cba201aef-2060x1236.jpeg

0.008, 1.05 and 32.31 are very different level of any phenomenon. Peaceful Muslims are much, much, much, much, much worse (by what mathematicians call five orders of magnitude) than peaceful Hindus or Buddhists. Even a warlike Buddhist or Hindu is significantly more peaceful than a specifically peaceful Muslim. Repeated Islamic assertions that they are peaceful only show how little they understand respect for human life and other people's freedom, and what a very, very, very poor concept of peace they have.

It is often repeated that 99% of Muslims are peaceful and did not kill anyone yesterday – or this year. 80 million Germans (1939 census) are responsible for the death of 6 million Hebrews in four years. Statistically, by an equal distribution of responsibility among the whole German population, more than 98% of Germans did not kill any Jew in any single of the four years of the *shoah*. 98%-99% of statistically innocent people is a very bad chosen reference value, as it would be compatible with the worst genocide ever perpetrated. In any case the Srebrenica genocide (8400) equally distributed among Serbians would give only 1120 victims per million persons, leaving 99.9% of Serbians innocent of any Islamic blood...

Muslims are however still very far from genocide values (19000 per million and year during *shoah*, by not considering Axis' allies): 32.31 per million in 14 years corresponds to 2.3 per million and year, however in a body count of victims with known perpetrators, whose values should be multiplied by 2.33 to gain a linear interpolation of responsibility for all victims, that sounds 0.0013; 0.001; 0.11; 0.174; 5.37 per year and million Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Christians and Muslims. But the Islamic rate was 13.38 in 2014, *counting only* (as we have done so far) *religiously motivated terrorist acts, but extrapolating from victims with known perpetrators to all victims*; using the value given by *thereligionofpeace.com* for any religiously motivated murder it would be 20 in the same year. The last available value (2012) for the *worldwide* global rate for murder of *any type* was 62 per million, the lowest, but widespread value for great areas 30 per million (most of Europe, Oceania, Eastern Asia) – however only 9 per million in Italy, 7 in Sweden, 8 in Spain, in 2012 and as typical values of the last years.

Muslims did also kill for religious motives in 2014 twice as much as some European people typically do for *any* reason and two thirds as much the whole population of large statistical areas typically do *for any reason*. The global worldwide rate for any kind of murder was in 2012 *only thrice* the Muslim rate for any kind of *religiously* motivated murder in 2014.

Not 1%, but anything above 1 per million and year should appear an alarming rate of religiously motivated murder, *not compatible with the designation of any specific religion as a vehicle of peace*.

2. Multiple attacks

9/11 was an epochal event for different reasons:

- the use of a new technique (aircraft hijacking with the intent to use the aircraft as a mass destruction weapon), never again repeated at the cost of wide transformation of civil air flight (including termination of supersonic Concorde);
- the attack to the economic capital of the Western world, New York, no other main Western city having paid before a high death toll (more than 100 dead persons) on a single day: Madrid will follow on 11 March 2004 (191 dead people), Paris on 13 November 2015 (130 dead people), while the London bombings on 7 July 2005 killed “only” 56 persons;
- the huge number of victims (2977), a macabre record not to be ever equalled, adding with a single event 1.86 per million and year to the 2001 Islamic rate of religiously motivated murder – and yet well below the potential of death aimed by the terrorists: on any given day some 100000 people are to be found in the Towers, but about 9:00 of 9/11 there were probably only 14000-19000, mainly under the point

of attack (93rd-99th floors in the North Tower) and people in the South Tower spontaneously evacuated their building between the first and second crash, so that “only” 1366 died at or above the floors of impact in the North Tower, about 600 in the South Tower – 414 further victims were among rescuers (343 firemen and 71 police officers), 147 on the planes, for a total of 2753 people in New York;

- the use of combined tactics, coordinating four attacks: the two most lethal on the Twin Towers in New York, the attack to the Pentagon, with 125 victims among its workers and the main, but failed attack either to White House or Capitol, for which had been designated United Airlines Flight 93 (Newark-San Francisco), that was hijacked at 9:28 and crashed on 10:03 after a revolt started at 9:53 by passengers, already informed of the attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon – a suicidal revolt frustrating a suicidal mission;
- official condemnation of the terrorist acts was accompanied by intense celebration among the Islamic masses of the Magnificent 19, encouraging further terrorist activities.

Of specific interest for us is the question of the epochal effect of the tactic effect (combined attacks) on the further evolution of Islamic terrorism.

After 9/11 aircrafts were never hijacked again to be used as mass destruction weapons – thanks to increased controls, making air travel after 9/11 very different from air travel before, but probably also to a different policy and attitude of passengers and (better trained) crews, who now start to overwhelm the hijackers and would probably intentionally crash the aircraft to avoid its use as a terrorist weapon. So between 2001 and 2005 35 aircrafts were hijacked, between 2006 and 2010 only 16, between 2011 and 2014 only 9 – between 1996 and 2000 they had been 82, between 1991 and 1995 106, between 1986 and 1990 96, between 1981 and 1985 149, between 1976 and 1980 133, between 1971 and 1975 174, between 1968 and 1970 192, between 1961 and 1967 25, between 1951 and 1960 30. An already occurring steady decline of the traditional, not suicidal hijacking from his golden period (1968 to 1985), significantly started by the hijacking of El Al Flight 426 from Rome to Tel Aviv on 23 July 1968, to the end of the XX century was followed by another steady decline of any aircraft hijacking, and specifically the suicidal ones, after 9/11 – leading to about two hijacking a year, less than in the 1950s, when however less than a billion passengers (vs. 3500-4000 billions now) was transported every year... Disquieting is however the evolution by which co-pilots hijacked on 17 February 2014 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 702 from Addis Ababa to Rome and, in a successful suicidal mission, without any political connotations, on 24 March 2015 Germanwings Flight 9525 from Barcelona to Düsseldorf.

9/11 did however not only involve the use as mass destruction weapons of hijacked aircrafts, but also the coordination of four strikes, to be brought in a short time window (the last aircraft being hijacked just before the third strike and the closure of the whole American air space). Did this coordination of multiple strike influence the successive tactics by Islamic terrorists?

Before 9/11 there had been only a few bad days, where multiple attacks across the same country had produced a high death toll (more than hundred victims): but only on 12 out of these 27 days the main attack had produced less than 75% of the victims. Five of these multiple attacks had been conducted in Sri Lanka, with toll deaths between 112 and 212, in 1987 (6 June) and 1990 (11 and 22 June, 3 and 8 August), four, with toll deaths between 118 and 282, in South America (29 April 1983, El Salvador; 20 February 1983, Peru; 26 October 1995, Cartagena and 17 December 1997, Pavarando, both in Colombia), one in India by Sikh extremists (15 June 1991), two, by unknown perpetrators, in Algeria (3 Au-

gust 1997, 104 victims; 30 December 1997, 412 victims). This coordination had already been used in the '80 and '90 in Sri Lanka, South America had also entered the Islamic technical space only in 1997.

After 9/11 however there were already 31 days with multiple attacks and on 19 of them the main attack had produced less than 75% of the victims. Of these 19 multiple attacks only one was conducted in Sudan by the Christian Lord's Resistance Army (8 May 2002) with a huge death toll (470); three attacks on the same day were perpetrated in Nigeria by Fulani militants on 14 March 2014 (100 dead persons), seven were perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria with high death tolls (106-300) on 27 July 2009, 20 January 2012, 1 March, 17 and 20 May, 3 and 4 June 2014. Different forces, Islamic and not, combatting the same political battle (Kashmir) were responsible each for their own part of the multiple incidents on New Delhi (29 October 2015), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi for the attacks on Shiites in Pakistan (10 January 2013), the Deccan Mujahideen for the multiple attacks on Mumbai on 26 November 2008. Jemaah Islamiya was responsible for the double attack on Kuta (Indonesia) on 12 October 2012. In the Middle East an al Qaida affiliate, Tawhid and Jihad, for the double attack in Iraq on 2 March 2004, another, Al-Nusrah Front, for the double attack on Homs on 29 April 2014, al Qaida for the multiple attack on Baghdad on 8 December 2009, ISIL for the multiple attack on Iraq on 25 October 2009. Yet another al-Qaida affiliate, Abu Hafis al-Masri Brigades, claimed the multiple attacks against Madrid on 11 March 2004 (191 victims). Unknown perpetrators were responsible for a double attack on Tal Afar (Iraq) on 30 March 2007, 290 victims.

With single exceptions (one in Sudan by Lord's Resistance Army, another in Nigeria by Fulani militants, unknown perpetrators in Iraq) multiple attacks were used, after 9/11, consistently and almost exclusively by Islamic organizations – and specifically characterize the worst black days, both in the First world (Atocha 2004, Paris 2015) and elsewhere (Mumbai 2006 and 2008): this is the technical lesson that al Qaida taught its affiliates, but also Boko Haram learnt, directly or indirectly, from them. This is also the legacy of 9/11 on Islamic jihad – and on the Islamic world, often rejoicing in the streets for the US victims more intensely than their rulers officially condemned the attacks.

3. *Islamic terrorism's hit-list*

As a basis for this hit-list we have used the (conservative) estimations of victims in GTD, however counting together victims hit in multiple attacks perpetrated on the same day in the same country. Listed are all attacks or multiple attacks (with the main attack responsible for less than 75% of the toll death) producing in the period 2001-2014 at least 100 victims on the same day – victims of not Islamic attacks are added for reference in a second list²⁸:

1. 9/11, already described, 2977 victims;
2. ISIL's massacre of Shiites in Badush on 10 June 2014, 670 victims²⁹;

²⁸ We did not find photos or images for each and every attack.

Some attacks are documented here and in a separate section of our collection of images, most however only once, either here with a single photo (but exceptionally four for the Peshawar school attacks, two for the Moscow hostage crisis), or there with a larger set.

Specificity was preferred to quality: better to use a low quality image of damages after the Benisheik attacks (n 27) than a high quality, and much used, image of the governor listening to a villager after them...

²⁹ L. Harding – F. Hawramy, *Isis accused of ethnic cleansing as story of Shia prison massacre emerges*, Guardian 25-8-2014; *Pillay Accuses IS Rebels of Ethnic Cleansing*, Times of Oman 25-8-2014.

The estimation of victims relies ultimately on UN Commissioner Pillay's denunciation of ISIS' ethnic cleansing. Photo (n. 1): i.huffpost.com/gen/2736030/images/o-ISIS-facebook.jpg

3. ISIL's massacre of Yazidis (not Islamic monotheists with Gnostic beliefs rather than Islamic heretics) in Sinjar about 9 August 2014, 500 victims³⁰;
 4. Boko Haram's attack on Gamboru Ngala (Borno State, Nigeria) on 5 May 2014, 315 victims³¹;
 5. multiple attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria on 3 June 2014, 300 victims³²;
 6. a not better detailed incident in the Palmyra district perpetrated by ISIL on 17 July 2014, 270 victims (including executed prisoners);³³
 7. the Al Qaeda in Iraq's bombings against Yazidi in Kahtaniya (near Mosul) on 15 August 2007, 248 victims³⁴;
 8. multiple attacks by Boko Haram on Maiduguri in Nigeria on 27 July 2009, 215 victims;³⁵
 9. bombings by unknown perpetrators against Shiites in Sadr City, near Baghdad, on 23 November 2006, 202 victims;³⁶
 10. bombings on Kuta (Indonesia) by Jemaah Islamiya on 12 October 2002, 200 victims (and among them 88 Australians);³⁷
 11. the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004, a multiple attack by an al-Qaeda's affiliate, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, 191 victims³⁸;
 12. multiple attacks in Kano by Boko Haram on 20 January 2012, 188 victims³⁹;
-
- 30 R.Spencer, *Isil carried out massacres and mass sexual enslavement of Yazidis, UN confirms*, Telegraph 14-10-2014; P.Vale, *Islamic State 'execute 500 Yazidis' with some victims 'buried alive'*, Huffington Post 10-8-2014. The higher estimation (up to 5000) by UN, most newspapers and wikipedia might be less specific, by referring to all Yazidi victims in the same month – but in any case significantly increases the death toll. Photo (n. 2): 217.218.67.233/photo/20151116/0071d1a3-12e9-4cb0-8028-a6350c9048c9.jpg
On ISIL's persecution of Yazidis see also photos nn. 117-124:
nena-news.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/yazidi.jpg
cdn3.vox-cdn.com/assets/4874928/453210790.jpg
i.huffpost.com/gen/1956944/thumbs/o-YAZIDI-facebook.jpg
img-s2.onedio.com/id-55bf8be554efa1585581a66f/rev-0/raw/s-3a33d7453522c45e2898306da234697ba2bd6322.jpg
www.transconflict.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Yazidis_Iraq.jpg
www.themiddleeastmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/yazidis-helicopter.jpg
static.independent.co.uk/s3fs-public/styles/story_large/public/thumbnails/image/2014/08/14/08/v2-Yazidi.jpg
www.kurdishblogger.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Yazidi-IDPs-on-Mount-Sinjar.jpg
- 31 *Hundreds killed in Boko Haram raid on unguarded Nigerian town*, Guardian 8-5-2014. Photo (n. 3): i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2014/05/12/article-2626019-1DC5C9CE00000578-724_964x633.jpg
- 32 *Nigerian villagers 'killed in Boko Haram church attack'*, BBC News 4-6-2014; A. Abubakar, *Boko Haram raids kill hundreds*, CNN 5-6-2014.
- 33 *Islamic State killed 270 in Syrian gas field battle: monitor*, Reuters 19-7-2014.
- 34 D. Cave – J. Glanz, *Toll in Iraq bombings is raised to more than 500*, New York Times 22-8-2007; W. Schneider, *Irak: Yaziden fürchten nach Attentaten ihre „Ausrottung“*, Die Presse 16-8-2007. Photo (n. 4): s1.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20070816&t=2&i=1309470.
- 35 C. Duffield, *Nigerian Islamist attacks spread*, BBC News 27-7-2009; D. Smith, *Nigerian 'Taliban' offensive leaves 150 dead*, Guardian 27-7-2009. Photo (n.5): nem-borno.cfsites.org/files/nem21.gif
- 36 *Devastating blasts hit Sadr City*, BBC News 23-11-2006; J. Steele, *Baghdad's day of sectarian death: five car bombs, 160 killed*, Guardian 24-11-2006; R. Todd, *New brutality seen in Iraq killings*, CBS News 25-11-2006. Photo (n. 6): s3.subirimagenes.com:81/imagen/6902961sdfgsdfgsdf.png.
- 37 *Bali night club bomb kills 180*, Guardian 13-10-2002; *Bali death toll set at 202*, BBB News 19-2-2003. Photo (n. 7): nickburgoyne.com/kuta_from_above/legian01.jpg.
- 38 *La policía y los forenses rebajan a 190 el número de víctimas mortales en los atentados de Madrid*, El País 23-3-2004.
- 39 M. Oboh, *Islamist insurgents kill over 178 in Nigeria's Kano*, Reuters 22-1-2012; *Boko Haram bombs Kano afresh*, Vanguard 24-1-2012; *Nigeria: more bombs found as death toll rises*, SkyNews 23-1-2012. Photo (n. 8): www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/21/nigeria-attacks-claimed-by-boko-haram.

13. the Mumbai bombings perpetrated by Lashkar-e-Taiba on 11 July 2006, 187 victims⁴⁰;
14. multiple attacks in Mumbai by Deccan Mujahideen on 26 November 2008, 172 victims⁴¹;
15. multiple attacks in Nigeria by Boko Haram on 17 May 2014, 170 victims;
16. a double attack at Karbala and Baghdad in Iraq on 2 March 2004 by al-Qaeda's affiliate Tawhid and Jihad, 164 victims among Shiites commemorating Ashura;⁴²
17. the Baghdad bombings by al-Qaeda in Iraq on 14 September 2005, 160 victims⁴³;
18. a bombing by unknown perpetrators targeting Shiites at Tal Afar (Iraq) on 31 March 2007, 152 victims⁴⁴;
19. a double attack on Baghdad by ISIL on 25 October 2009, 151 victims⁴⁵;
20. an attack on Yakawlang in Afghanistan by Taliban on 7 January 2001, 150 victims⁴⁶;
21. a bombing by unknown perpetrators of Amerli (Iraq) on 7 July 2007, 150 victims⁴⁷;
22. a not better detailed terrorist incident in Mosul on 7 September 2014, 150 victims;
23. a massacre by ISIL documented by a mass grave found in Ramadi on 29 October 2014, 150 victims⁴⁸;
24. a massacre by ISIL of women and girls refusing their policy of sexual jihad enforced in Fallujah after the fall of the city, 150 victims⁴⁹;
25. the Peshawar school massacre perpetrated by Tehrik-i-Taliban on 16 December 2014, 150 victims⁵⁰;

⁴⁰ *Scores dead in Mumbai train bombs*, BBC News 11-7-2006; R. Gaikwad, *7/11 train bombings case: death for 5 convicts*, Hindu 1-10-2015.

⁴¹ *Mumbai rocked by deadly attacks*, BBC News 27-11-2008; J. Leahy – J.Fontanella-Khan, *India's home minister resigns over Mumbai attacks*, Financial Times 30-11-2008.

⁴² *Deadly attacks rock Baghdad, Karbala*, CNN 2-3-2004.

⁴³ *Scores killed in Baghdad attacks*, BBC News 14-9-2005.

Photo (n.9) :i.guim.co.uk/img/static/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2005/09/14/2iraql.jpg?sw=1200&q=85&auto=format&sharp=10&s=ea073848931b5bbbb9d8ff73f16dd114

⁴⁴ *Toll rises as Iraq attacks continue*, Al-Jazeera 1-4-2007.

Photo (n. 10): www.ellitoral.com/um/fotos/138145_02.jpg.

⁴⁵ R. Nordland, *Iraq reaches voting deal as toll rises in bombings*, New York Times 26-10-2009.

Photo (n. 11): multimedia.pol.dk/archive/00388/IRAQ_EXPLOSIONS_388265a.jpg

⁴⁶ K. Clark, *Conflicting claims in Afghan fighting*, BBC News 22-1-2001.

Photo (n. 12): www.saaajs.com/new/images/yakawlang_jan9_2014/yakawlang_photo_exhibition_3.jpg

⁴⁷ S. Farrell, *Around 150, death toll in Iraq attack among war's worst*, New York Times 9-7-2007.

Photo (n.13): static01.nyt.com/images/2007/07/08/world/09iraq-600.jpg

⁴⁸ D. Blair, *Mass grave with 150 bodies found in Iraq*, Telegraph 30-10-2014.

Photo (n. 14): islamtimes.org/images/docs/000423/n00423351-b.jpg.

⁴⁹ H. Saul, *Isis 'executes scores of women for refusing to marry militants'*, Iraq ministry claims, Independent 17-12-2014.

⁵⁰ *Peshawar school massacre: What we know*, BBC News 17-12-2014; *Pakistan raises death toll in Peshawar school attack to 148*, Los Angeles Times 17-12-2014.

Photos (nn. 15-17): d.ibtimes.co.uk/en/full/1415177/pakistan-peshawar-school-massacre.jpg?w=736;

www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/17/asia-pacific/pakistani-taliban-the-group-behind-the-peshawar-school-massacre/#.VpzIbUvFfRo;

media2.s-nbcnews.com/j/newscms/2014_51/816296/peshawar-vigil-

04534961_5fad86d3483b149f5590c6f100386da9.nbcnews-fp-1200-800.jpg

We remind that the Beslan massacre (see below, under c), on 1-3 September of the same year, had been much bloodier: with much hesitation we chose to consider prevalently separatist rather than prevalently Islamic the Chechen terrorists as a whole. Once taken this decision, not the Beslan massacre, but its Peshawar copy is here relevant – others might however think differently and set it from this footnote back in the main narrative.

26. a double attack in Nigeria by Boko Haram on 4 June 2014, 145 victims⁵¹;
27. Boko Haram's attack on Benisheik (Nigeria) on 17 September 2013, 142 victims⁵²;
28. a bomb by Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami aiming to eliminate Benazir Bhutto and kill many of her supporters in Karachi (Pakistan) on 18 October 2007, 139 victims⁵³;
29. multiple attacks in Nigeria by Boko Haram on 20 May 2014, 137 victims⁵⁴;
30. multiple attacks by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi against Shiites in Pakistan on 10 January 2013, 136 victims⁵⁵;
31. an attack on Yuzhnoportovy in Moscow by the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) on 23 October 2002, 130 victims among about 850 hostages taken in the Dubrovka Theater and held there for four days;⁵⁶
32. an attack on Baghdad by al-Qaeda in Iraq on 18 April 2007, 127 victims⁵⁷;
33. multiple attacks on Baghdad by al-Qaeda in Iraq on 8 December 2009, 127 victims⁵⁸;
34. an attack by al-Nusrah Front on Khan al-Assal (Syria) on 23 July 2013, 123 victims⁵⁹;
35. an attack by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan on Peshawar (Pakistan) on 28 October 2009, 120 victims⁶⁰;
36. an attack by Boko Haram on Kano's mosque on 28 November 2014, 120 victims⁶¹;

The last image (n.18) is very specific: among students protesting in India against the Peshawar attack, we chose the Sikhs, asking to be not targeted either as students or as Sikhs, Sikhism being a different religion founded at the boundary between Islam and Hinduism, and so often persecuted by Muslims: www.thenational.ae/storyimage/AB/20141218/ARTICLE/141218888/AR/0/AR-141218888.jpg

51. *Nigerian villagers 'killed in Boko Haram church attack'*, BBC News 4-6-2014.
Image (n. 19): voiceofthepersecuted.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/nigeria-attacks-on-christians.jpg
52. *Nigeria's Boko Haram unrest: Scores dead in Benisheik raid*, BBC News 19-9-2013; *Nigerian Islamists kill at least 159 in two attacks*, Reuters 20-9-2013.
Photo (n. 20): allafrica.com/download/pic/main/main/csiid/00251895.jpg
53. *Death toll rises in Bhutto attack*, CNN 19-10-2007.
Photo (n. 21): nation.com.pk/national/18-Oct-2014/karachi-ppp-remembers-karsaz-tragedy
54. M. Mark, *Nigeria bombings leave scores dead in city of Jos*, Guardian 21-5-2014.
Photo (n. 22): ichef.bbci.co.uk/images/ic/1920x1080/p01zhtkw.jpg
55. J. Boone, *Pakistan bombings: Quetta death toll over 100*, Guardian 11-3-2013.
Photo (n. 23): gdb.rferl.org/ABCB771E-F4A3-436A-8A47-F53724D33486.jpg
This photo shows however the relatives' refusal to bury the bodies after the next bombing in February (here not registered, because it had only 90 victims) – with funerals delayed (against Islamic rule, ordering to bury on the same day of death) by their protest for four days: www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21504249.
56. Photo (nn. 24-25): tocka.com.mk/images/content/sodrzina/putin-vlijanie-istiv-19.jpg
s00.yaplakal.com/pics/pics_original/7/9/5/6438597.jpg
There is however some discussions about the responsibility for most deaths, with critics blaming the use of gas by rescuing forces as the lethal factor: *'When kids bury kids': Russia remembers 130 victims of Nord-Ost terror act 10 years on*, RT 23-10-2012; M. Wines, *The aftermath in Moscow: post-mortem in Moscow; Russia names drug in raid, defending use*, New York Times 31-10-2002.
57. *Up to 200 killed in Baghdad bombs*, BBC News 18-4-2007. Photo (n. 26): www.pronews.gr/portal/sites/default/files/styles/830x420/public/GALLERY/IRAQL_0.jpg
58. *Baghdad car bombs cause carnage*, BBC News 8-12-2009.
Photo (n. 27): www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2009/dec/08/iraq-bomb-blasts-baghdad#img-3
59. H. Mourtada – R. Gladstone, *Soldiers' mass execution reported by Syria group*, New York Times 26-7-2013 (with 51 surrendered prisoners executed). Photo (n. 28): www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/602736_549578388411281_2089223765_n.jpg
60. *Death toll from Peshawar blast rises to 117*, Dawn 30-10-2009.
Photo (n. 29): ic.pics.livejournal.com/amelito/1047045/118359/118359_original.jpg
61. *Nigeria unrest: Kano mosque attack kills dozens*, BBC News 28-11-2014. Photo (n. 30): a.abcnews.com/images/International/ap_nigeria_mosque_bombing_kb_140113_4x3_992.jpg

37. an attack by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to SuperFerry 14, which had sailed out of Manila (Philippines), on 27 February 2004, 116 victims⁶²;
38. multiple attacks on New Delhi by Kashmir separatists (Mahaz-e-Inquilab) and Lashkar-e-Taiba on 29 October 2005, two days before the Hindu festival of Diwali, 116 victims⁶³;
39. an attack against Jaar (Yemen) by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on 28 March 2011, 110 victims;
40. a Sunni bombing targeting Shiites in Al-Hillah (Iraq) on 28 February 2005, 109 victims;⁶⁴
41. multiple attacks in Nigeria by Boko Haram on 1 March 2014, 106 victims⁶⁵;
42. an attack by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Mohmand district (Pakistan) on 9 July 2010, 104 victims⁶⁶;
43. a bombing by ISIL on Baghdad on 19 August 2009, 101 victims⁶⁷;
44. a bombing by Tawhid and Jihad, an al-Qaeda's affiliate, against a Shiite mosque in Najaf on 29 August 2003, 100 victims⁶⁸;
45. an attack by Taliban against Kandahar (Afghanistan) on 17 February 2008, 100 victims⁶⁹;
46. an attack against Damboa in Nigeria by Boko Haram on 18 July 2014, 100 victims⁷⁰;
47. an attack against Gwoza in Nigeria by Boko Haram on 6 August 2014, 100 victims⁷¹.

Not Islamic attacks:

- a) multiple attacks in Sudan by (Christian) Lord's Resistance Army on 8 May 2002, 470 victims;
- b) an attack in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Lord's Resistance Army on 17 January 2009, 400 victims;
- c) the massacre of Beslan by Chechen terrorists (Riyad-us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs) on 1-3 September 2004, 317 victims;
- d) the destruction of Malaysia Airlines flight 17, by Donetsk separatists on 17 July 2014, 298 victims;
- e) a double attack on Tal Afar (Iraq) by unknown perpetrators on 30 (or 27?) March 2007, 290 victims;

⁶² *Bomb caused Philippine ferry fire*, BBC News 11-10-2004.

Photo (n. 31): Human rights watch, *Lives destroyed. Attacks against civilians in the Philippines*, July 2007, p. 12.

⁶³ Photo (n. 32): www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2005/10/30/447903.html

⁶⁴ Photo (n. 33): image2.sina.com.cn/dy/w/2005-02-28/U41P1T1D5958905F21DT20050228202100.jpg

⁶⁵ *Nigeria: 'We live in fear of Boko Haram'*, Guardian 2-5-2014. Photo (n. 34):

saharareporters.com/2014/03/10/photonews-damage-boko-haram-did-jakana-village-borno-state

⁶⁶ *Pakistan suicide bombing death toll jumps to 102*, CBS News 10-7-2010.

Photo (n. 35): msnbcmedia3.msn.com/j/MSNBC/Components/Slideshows/_production/ss-100709-pakistan-bombing/ss-100709-pakistan-05.grid-9x2.jpg

⁶⁷ *Fresh violence strikes Baghdad*, Al-Jazeera 20-8-2009. Photo (n. 36):

msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Components/Photo/_new/g-cvr-090819-iraq-blasts2-6a.jpg

⁶⁸ *Mourners demand vengeance for cleric's death*, Guardian 2-9-2003.

Photo (n. 37): niklife.com.ua/images/2012_08/31498_2_932x600.jpeg

⁶⁹ *Afghan bomb toll 'rises to 100'*, BBC News 18-2-2008.

⁷⁰ *Nigeria: Boko Haram tue au moins 100 personnes*, La Presse 19-7-2014.

Photo (n. 38): media.premiumtimesng.com/wp-content/files/2014/03/Boko-Haram-Borno-attack2.jpg

⁷¹ *Massacre in predominantly Christian Gwoza, Nigeria said to leave 100 dead*, Morning Star News 8-8-2014.

Photo (n. 39): media.premiumtimesng.com/wp-content/files/2014/08/DSC_0119.jpg

- f) the Bentiu massacre in South Sudan perpetrated on 15 April 2014 by Sudan people's liberation movement in opposition (SLPM-IO), 287 victims;
- g) an attack on Maria Teresa Community (Angola) on 11 August 2011 by National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 259 victims;
- h) bombing of Atlas Creek Island in Nigeria by the separatist Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on 12 May 2006, 200 victims;
- i) a terrorist attack on Galadima (Nigeria) by separatist Fulani militants on 5 April 2014, 200 victims;
- j) the Ürümqi separatist riots on 5 July 2009, leaving 184 victims in Xinjiang's capital;
- k) a terrorist incident by anti-governmental rebels in N'Djamena (Chad) on 1 February 2008, 160 victims;
- l) a Maoist attack on Gama in Nepal on 7 May 2002, 140 victims;
- m) an attack on Omdurman (Sudan) by Justice and Equality Movement on 10 May 2008, 134 victims;
- n) an attack by unknown perpetrators on Baghdad on 3 February 2007, 119 victims;
- o) an attack by the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) against Bojaya (Colombia) on 2 May 2002, 119 victims;
- p) an attack by Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) on Midnapore (India) on 28 May 2010, 115 victims;
- q) an attack against Muttur in Sri Lanka on 5 August 2006 by separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 100 victims;
- r) a double attack against Homs (Syria) by al-Qaeda's affiliate Al-Nusrah Front on 29 April 2014, 100 victims;
- s) an attack by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) against Niangara (Democratic Republic of the Congo) on 6 August 2009, 100 victims;
- t) multiple attacks in Nigeria by Fulani militants on 14 March 2014, 100 victims.

In the following table we confront the number of victims for each incident in GTD and in other most common and reliable sources⁷²:

	GTD	thereligionofpeace	wikipedia	newspapers
9/11	2977	2976	2977	–
Badush	670	670	670	670
Sinjar	500	457	5000	5000
Gamboru Ngala	315	336	300/336	300
Nigeria 3/6/14	300	309	–	400-500
Palmyra district	270	270	270	270
Kahtaniya (Mosul)	248	–	500	400-600
Maiduguri	215	–	700 ⁷³	100-150
Sadr City	202	202	215	144-215
Kuta	200	202	202	180-202
Madrid	191	201	193	190
Kano 2012	188	259	185	178-185
Mumbai 2006	187	209	209	160-189
Mumbai 2008	172	178	166	101-192
Nigeria 17/5/2014	170 ⁷⁴	69	–	72

⁷² Data from thereligionofpeace were collected at the end of 2015 and not checked again after its restyling, observed on 18/1/2016.

⁷³ Between 26 and 29 July.

	GTD	thereligionofpeace	wikipedia	newspapers
Karbala Baghdad 2004	164	181	178	143
Baghdad 2005	160	134	160	10
Tal Afar	152	152	152	152
Baghdad 10/2009	151	160	155	155
Yakawlang 2001	150	*75	100 (UN)	100
Amerli	150	156	156	150
Mosul 7/9/2014	150	–	–	–
Ramadi	150	150	–	150
Fallujah (Anbar)	150	150	–	150
Peshawar	150	148	148	141-148
Nigeria 4/6/14	145	–	–	–
Beni Shiek	142	161	159	159
Karachi	139	138	180	136
Nigeria 20/5/14	137	162	118	118
Quetta	136	105	130	>100
Yuzhnoportovy	130	129	133	130
Baghdad 2007	127	192	198	almost 200
Baghdad 12/2009	127	127	127	127
Khan al-Assal	123	51	51/123	150
Peshawar	120	117	117	117
Kano	120	120	120	120
Superferry (at sea)	116	186	116	116
New Delhi 2005	116	62 ⁷⁶	62	–
Jaar	110	150	–	–
Al-Hillah	109	135	127	–
Nigeria 1/3/2014	106	106	–	74
Mohmand	104	105	100	102
Baghdad 8/2009	101	95	101	101
Najaf	100	85	95	80-120
Kandahar	100	101	100	over 100
Dambova	100	21	over 100	100
Gwoza	100	997	200 ⁷⁷	–

4. Selected places

If the distinction between January and November 2015 Paris bombings instinctively appears macabre, it should be reminded of many places where these distinctions must be routinely used.

For Baghdad Wikipedia distinguishes three major attacks in 2003, four in 2004, two in 2005, three in 2006, eleven in 2007, four in 2008, seven in 2009, ten in 2010, five in 2011, five in 2012, five in 2013, two in 2015 – for 2014 religionofpeace has 211 minor incidents,

⁷⁴ GTD mentions next to the attacks in Dalwa-Masuba (40 victims) and Ngurosoye (29) also another attack with 101 victims, between the cities of Maiduguri and Damaturu, not accounted for by religionofpeace and difficult to identify on newspapers.

⁷⁵ religionofpeace lists only attacks after 9/11 – this incident happened before, in January 2001.

⁷⁶ Not considering, as wikipedia, Lashkar-e-Taiba's victims.

⁷⁷ Wikipedia dates the massacre at 2 June.

up to 73 victims in the bloodiest one... Among these major attacks the 2004 Ashura bombings, the 2006 Buratha mosque bombing, the 2007 al-Khilani mosque bombing against Shiites, and the 2013 Christmas Day bombings.

If Baghdad may appear in a war region, Mumbai, in peaceful India, did suffer the 2006 Mumbai train bombings (see further, § 6.2), the 2008 Mumbai attacks (see further, § 6.4) and the 2011 Mumbai bombings⁷⁸; Pune the 2010 and 2012 bombings, Varanasi the 2006 and 2010 bombings, Delhi the 2005 bombing and both the 12 September and the 27 September 2008 bombings.

In Pakistan Quetta, Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, Rawalpindi attacks in the XXI century received in Wikipedia until 2013 their own ordinal number: up to Quetta VII, Peshawar XVII, Karachi XI, Khyber VII, Lahore XII, Rawalpindi VI.

For those who still think in the old categories of interreligious conflicts between Hindus and Muslims at the end of the British colonization it is important to stress that Islamists bomb Hindus in India, Muslims in Pakistan, while very seldom and inefficiently Hindus put bombs. Abhinav Bharat is probably responsible for two out of four incidents it was initially blamed between 2006 and 2008 (the other two having most probably be perpetrated by Islamists), while much longer is the list of cases of violence against Hindus in India in the XXI century.

In Nigeria there were at least the 2003 and the 2005 Baga massacres, the February 2014 Borno massacre and the June 2014 Borno State attacks, before the September 2015 Borno State bombings, the April and the June 2012 Kaduna bombings, the April and the May 2014 Nyanya bombings.

In Indonesia Jakarta had the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 and the 2009 Jakarta bombings, Bali the 2002 and 2005 bombings, Poso the 2002 and 2004 bombings.

5. *Intra-religious murder*

The Shiite pilgrimage site of Karbala hosted the 2003 bombings, the 2004 Ashura bombings⁷⁹, the 2007 bombings. But bombings on Shiites celebrating Ashura are common every single year⁸⁰, in one or more Muslim cities... Attacks on Shiites during their prayers in the mosque are very frequent in Pakistan, where Sunni terrorists so maximize casualties and emphasize the religious dimensions of their attack – intra-religious lethal violence, theoretically strongly banned by Islam, is by far more flourishing than inter-religious violence: and we refer here not generically to insiders or outsiders as victims of violence used to affirm a religious goal, but most specifically to heretics or people of different religion as intended victims, as victims of a very specific hate crime. The most paradox example of Islamic intra-religious violence is probably the September 2010 Quetta bombing, when at least 73 people were killed by a bomb thrown by Islamists against Shiites expressing solidarity with Palestinians on Quds day...⁸¹

A specific assessment of the relevance of intra-religious violence among Islamic religious violence, i.e. the percentage of cases where terrorists specifically and intentionally kill their heretics to affirm their own sharia goes beyond the scope of this paper – but while (Chris-

⁷⁸ Photos (nn. 89-90): images.indiatvnews.com/mainnational/Mumbai_ATS_Arre13802.jpg
media.washtimes.com/s3.amazonaws.com/media/image/2011/07/14/20110714-192316-pic-925860716.jpg

⁷⁹ Photos (nn. 111-112):
i2.cdn.turner.com/cnnnext/dam/assets/130314213508-29-iraq-war-horizontal-large-gallery.jpg
a.scp.r.org/i/53b53adbcc154e131b52e4de4e952e87/56883-wide.jpg

⁸⁰ E.g. 2009 (photo n. 113): s1.dn.mcdn.net/HPQNM/1280x720-A0g.jpg
 2011 (photo n. 114): www.charlesapple.com/uploads/2011/12/111207WashingtonPostPic.jpg
 2013 (photo n. 115): www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media/images/photographs/2013_Iraq_Ashura.jpg
 2015 (photo n. 116): static.euronews.com/articles/315796/606x340_315796.jpg

⁸¹ S. Masood, *Suicide bomber kills 53 at Shiite protest*, New York Times 3-9-2010.

tian) theologians often insist on a stronger prohibition of intra-religious murder within Islam, Muslims nowadays do intensely practice sectarian killing of their heretics. In the Christian world internal religious homogeneity was mainly obtained by expulsion of heretics, Roman and Spanish Inquisition remaining rather the exception than the standard, and even more so *la Saint-Barthélemy* (improperly used by pope Francis I to minimize Islamic violence after the murder of Charlie Hebdo), *les Micheliades* or *il sacro macello della Valtellina* – only Anabaptists were universally and very intensely persecuted, *and systematically murdered*, by any and every Christian religious authority, for their pacific and coherent testimony of Gospel...

However, to the very contrary of what, within an illogical argumentation [no murderer being able to absolve and justify another one...], pope Francis I said, there was never any Christian religious cleansing comparable to the systematic elimination by mass murder of any kind of Islamic heretics (from Shiites to Ahmadiyya) in large parts of the Islamic world, and not only by Islamic State. On the contrary in historical perspective must be stressed as a further specificity of Islam (next to the great intensity of its schisms, that paradoxically do not last and institutionalize precisely *because of this intensity*) in our days an unprecedented degree of intra-religious violence, fortunately nowhere else to be found, now or in the past.

6. Selected incidents

6.1. 9/11

Although the incidents on 11 September 2001 have been object of a wide literature, for their already stressed epochal nature it seems preferable to give a short presentation of the events of the day, whose timeline is very clear and precise.

At 8:14 American airlines flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles, a Boeing 767 with 81 passengers and 11 crew members, is hijacked by three terrorists, two stabbing in business class two flight attendants, the other taking control of the cockpit. Via airphone at 8:19 another flight attendant alerts American airlines⁸², at 8:20 the aircraft is considered hijacked by the Boston flight controllers.

Meanwhile at 8:14 also United Airlines Flight 175, another Boeing 767, departed from Boston to Los Angeles, carrying nine crew members, 56 passengers and among them five terrorists – in contact with the other terrorists just before their taking off (a phone call, 6:52-6:55); how both groups succeeded in smuggling weapons through two different checkpoints, operated by two different contractors, of the same airport is not clear.

At 8:20 American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 with six crew members, 58 passengers and among them five terrorists departs from the Washington Dulles International Airport (an airport in Virginia, serving however Washington DC) for Los Angeles.

At 8:24 a communication to the cabin by the main hijacker of flight 11, Atta, is mistakenly broadcasted and received by the flight controllers. At 8:26 flight 11 turns toward New York City and is seen from flight 175, still free and confirming its position to flight controllers. Only at 8:37 NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) is requested military help to intercept the hijacked aircraft.

⁸² Betty Ong's and Amy Sweeney's emergency phone call (8:19-8:44) is the primary source on Flight 11 hijacking and gave some valuable information also to the authorities: to know that the aircraft was descending at 8:38, flowing too low at 8:44 (when the call ended) could not have avoided the crash on the tower at 8:46:40; two F-15 fighter jets were starting to intercept flight 11, when the aircraft fleeing without transponder, crashed onto the North Tower.

At 8:42 the last aircraft to be hijacked, United Airlines Flight 93, another Boeing 757, with seven crew members, 37 passengers and among them four terrorists, departs, with 40 minute delay, from Newark to San Francisco.

At 8:46:30, just when two F-15 fighter jets were ordered to intercept Flight 11, the aircraft crashed into the North Tower of World Trade Center⁸³ – at about the same time (8:42-8:46) the second aircraft, flight 175, was hijacked, the timing might be influenced by the optical recognition of flight 11's turning at 8:26: the terrorists probably were able to know that their colleagues had succeeded and when they would strike the first hit.

Again phone calls alerted the authorities, but operational evidence came quickly, already at 8:47; at 8:51 the aircraft had already changed its altitude, before phone calls arrived (8:52) to relatives or airlines offices, giving a short description of the events; the following calls, about 8:59-9:00, came just before the second strike onto the South Tower (9:03:11)⁸⁴.

Soon after the impact on the North Tower people trapped by fire and smoke in the upper floors began to jump into their death⁸⁵ – with one fire-fighter hit and killed by one of probably hundreds jumpers. The historical images of black smoke coming from the North Tower were transmitted locally at 8:48:08, broadcasted by CNN at 8:49:34, together with unconfirmed reports that a plane had crashed into the tower.

Meanwhile the two military jets sent to intercept flight 11 without a reference to its position were sent to patrol airspace over Long Island. The military defence of US airspace was thin and nobody had ever thought of aircraft hijacking in the prospective of a suicide mission; intentional disappearing, by switching off aircraft's transponder, was not expected and the search for a single, unidentified aircraft within the crowded airspace of New York almost impossible. Nine minutes between alarm and impact, the longest notice in this attack, were not sufficient to any valuable military reaction. The fighters were sent to Manhattan too late, when both towers had already been hit, but in any case it is hard to see what they could have done, even after the first hit: find a single unidentified aircraft and engage battle over New York? The fighters sent against the third hijacked aircraft and to protect the Pentagon arrived too late, and without any authorization to shoot down the plane – even when it was always clearer that it was attacking the Pentagon. There is some speculation about unarmed fighters intending to ram the fourth aircraft, had it not been crashed by counter-hijackers on board – but it is only easy speculation after different facts. Overall very convincing are therefore the conclusion drawn by the official report on the attacks:

The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. because

the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that

- the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
- there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
- hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.

⁸³ Photos (nn. 40-41): static2.businessinsider.com/image/5230eaa169bedd851da48e81-1200.jpg
cdn.theatlantic.com/static/infocus/911theday090811/a02_11114204.jpg

⁸⁴ Photos (nn. 42-45): 911memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/C.2010.102.1.jpg
multimedia.pol.dk/archive/00782/Sept_11_Lawsuit_782791a.jpg
www.wallpaperup.com/uploads/wallpapers/2014/08/09/420005/62ce93568cc3aa43ee614b1be0c68aa2.jpg
3.bp.blogspot.com/-z0j6-zwcyL4/VD7V877pPvI/AAAAAAAAACUk/gt5vqBUOKK8/s1600/Capture.PNG

⁸⁵ Photos (nn. 46-47): static1.businessinsider.com/image/5230798d6bb3f7dc37b48616-1200.jpg
static1.businessinsider.com/image/5230798becad04ba4284f3ea-1200.jpg

On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen.⁸⁶

Between 8:51 and 8:54 also the third aircraft, flight 77, was hijacked, at 8:54 deviated from its course towards south, at 8:56 the transponder was switched off. At 9:00, having lost a second aircraft, the American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey ordered all aircrafts of its company in the Northeast not to leave the ground. The first direct confirmation of the hijacking came at 9:12 through a private phone call; between 9:16 and 9:26 his wife, also on the hijacked aircraft, alerted the US Solicitor general, the third highest ranking official in the US Department of justice, Tom Olson, who unsuccessfully tried to alert Attorney general John Ashcroft.

Only at 9:05 was New York air space closed, at 9:13 the jet fighters were sent over Manhattan to establish at 9:25 a combat air patrol over the city – the stable door was also closed after the horse had bolted... This closure was also due to an intercepted communication that terrorists had *planes*; but all planes to be used against New York had already been used, other planes to be hijacked were already in the air – not even an immediate closure of airspace, which came only at 9:42, after the third crash onto the Pentagon (9:37:46), would have helped, because the terrorists controlled the third aircraft already before the second hit.

Only the fourth aircraft, flight 93, perhaps for its delayed departure, was hijacked after the second hit and FAA's warning to the crew (that since 9:24 knew of the Twin Towers) at 9:28: passengers knowing, like Tom Burnett, through phone calls to relatives of the three attacks might have been decisive for the suicidal counter-attack revolt frustrating the last suicidal attack. Its exact aim is uncertain, but was probably the most important target, as there is no doubt that the aircraft was flying toward Washington, where both Capitol and White House had already been ordered to evacuate at 9:45; FAA's warning had not prevented hijackers to take control of the cockpit and deviate the aircraft at 9:34, that did not switch off its transponder until 9:41, when it was already clear it was directed toward Washington. The first idea of a military response came only at 9:49, but a request reached NEADS only at 10:07, when the aircraft had already crashed in Pennsylvania, 125 miles (to be covered in 15') from Washington. The defence was complicated by a false alarm, stating that flight 11 had not hit the World Trade Center, but was on its route against Washington. The passengers' revolt had started at 9:57, as some phone calls attest, and about 10:02 the hijackers decided to pull the aircraft down – the suicidal revolt had not regained control of the aircraft, but aborted the terrorists' suicidal mission.

After the second hit, president Bush, on a visit in Florida and ill-informed about the first one, did not immediately interrupt his routine activity; the first videoconference at the White House began only at 9:25 – when the Pentagon was struck at 9:37, the participants to the military conference did not even know that the specific airplane had been hijacked...; flight 11, which had already struck the first hit, was thought fleeing against Washington, and the military did not know the hijacking of the fourth airplane, the one really attacking the capital. An authorization to engage was given only at some time between 10:10 and 10:15, when the last airplane had already crashed (10:03) thanks to the passengers' revolt: without which it would arrived at Washington before 10:23 without encountering any significant defence and found White House and Capitol evacuated (or evacuating?) starting at 9:43. Since 9:45 the US airspace was (not instantly) closing to civilian flights, with international ones redirected either to Canada (with operation Yellow ribbon) or Mexico (if they

⁸⁶ *The 9/11 commission report*, 31. 18.

came from South America) – for the first time not as the result of a scheduled simulation (as 1960 to 1962), but of a real emergency.

Two minutes after the start of the passengers' revolt on the last flight, collapsed (9:58:59) the South tower⁸⁷ and by its debris was struck and killed the chaplain to the New York firemen, the Franciscan Judge, designated as victim 0001, because his body was the first recovered – at this time the President is on Air Force One in the sky of Florida, without any destination. When flight 93 crashes, evacuations⁸⁸ of skyscrapers just begin in the whole country (Chicago, Minneapolis); at 10:13 begins the evacuation of the United Nations complex. At 10:20 president Bush from Air Force 1 confirms vice-president Cheney's late authorization (10:10-10:15) to shoot down menacing aircrafts. At 10:28 the North tower collapses⁸⁹, at 10:35 Air Force One directs to Louisiana, while military aircrafts patrol the sky over Washington. About 12:15 the continental US airspace is clear of any commercial or private flights, at 13:00 US military is put on high alert worldwide, at 18:45 the president is again in the White House, at 19:24 congressmen sing the national hymn before the Capitol in Washington, at 20:30 the president so addressed the nation from the White House:

Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed; our country is strong.

The responsibility of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida had been already asserted and the war against the Taliban will be decided at 21:00, on CIA director's opinion that al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban are the same thing. On 14 September a joint resolution of the House and the Senate was unanimously passed (with a single opposition, Barbara Lee, Democratic congresswoman for California) giving the president power of war against the terrorism, specifically stating that

the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

With the Pearl Harbour analogy, entered at 23:30 by Bush in his journal, a war had been improperly declared and improperly accepted, against an unspecified enemy – and the military, incapable to defend from the unexpected, dictated again an aggressive political agenda to America; when the search for survivors⁹⁰ was still on-going, recovery not yet begun⁹¹...

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- 87 Photos (nn. 48-50):
s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2015/09/10/rtr907i.jpg
911memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/folder1_19_1_hires.jpg
alibi.com/image/pix_id/42021/Saint-Nicholas.jpg
- 88 Photos of evacuation in New York (nn. 54-55):
www.vosizeeias.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Sept-11-Health_sham.jpg
behindthescenes.nyhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/2837_Samoilova.jpg
911memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/folder1_DSCN0013.jpg
- 89 Photos (nn. 51-53): cdn.theatlantic.com/static/infocus/911theday090811/a31_90105629.jpg
25838a3f-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/911whatyoumighthavemissed/home/wtc4.jpg
911memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/C.2009.65.10.jpg
- 90 Photos (nn. 57-60): timeline.911memorial.org/#Timeline/3/ImageEntry/576/3
911memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/recovery05_C_2009_64_126_1200.jpg
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/September_17_2001.jpg
static1.businessinsider.com/image/5230798becad04ac4284f3eb-1200
- 91 Ground zero before rebuilding (photos nn. 61-62):

In this perspective 9/11 doubly changed radically our world: the boundaries between peace and war had been violently challenged when commercial aircrafts had been transformed into military / terrorist weapons and suicidal bombers used aircrafts against skyscrapers instead of autos against people at the market; but also a declaration of war against a not national entity, or any nations harbouring it, was a huge step outside normal comprehension of peace and war. Somehow a violent, global retaliation should have compensated the deep inability to prevent an unexpected move, requiring however wide and costly preparative (probably \$500 million...). Coordinated activities became however always more usual and normal for Islamic terrorism, while (behind formal condemnations by every Islamic government) the Islamic folk was galvanized by their very first, albeit barbarian victory, and the West unanimously paid its tribute to its victims⁹², even before completing the Towers' reconstruction in 2014⁹³. Now, with the 2014 and 2015 new wave of much increased Islamic violence, the formal problem of a terrorist nation to engage war with has been solved, by ISIS' auto-proclamation as sovereign state, completely disregarding any humanitarian convention on warfare or prisoners.

In another perspective, on 9/11 the attackers could count on slow communication between the civil and military agencies – but were defeated at their same game by the rapidity of modern communication, and more specifically by the interaction of information on TV and private telephonic communication. The feedback of the events to the hijacked people on the last plane put the end to the glorious hour (in the strictest sense of the word...) of abuse of hijacked aircrafts as weapons – whose intrinsic limit is the suicidal revolt of the passengers, preferring to die as heroes than as part of a weapon against their country. Without the surprise effect, the chances to use efficiently a hijacked aircraft as a guided missile are minimal – the suicide attackers cannot prevent a suicidal revolt of their prisoners⁹⁴, who accepting the impossibility to be rescued can however destroy in time the weapon.

6.2. *Atocha (2004) and Mumbai (2006)*

On 11 March 2004 in Madrid⁹⁵ ten bombs exploded within 3 minutes (7:37-7:39) on four trains coming to Madrid from Alcalà de Henares: in Atocha station four bombs exploded on train number 21431, in Calle Tellez, approximately 800 meters before Atocha station, four bombs exploded on train number 17305, in El Pozo (two metro stations before Atocha) exploded further two bombs on train number 21435, in Santa Eugenia (two further metro

91 [1memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/timelineBackgroundGroundZero.jpg](http://memorialtimeline.blob.core.windows.net/media/images/timelineBackgroundGroundZero.jpg)
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/World_Trade_Center_3_After_9-11_Attacks_With_Original_Building_Locations.jpg

92 Tributes (nn. 63-65): i.imgur.com/Wk9f57D.jpg
danwin-files.s3.amazonaws.com/pics/blog/3911279956_e23bd049e1_b.jpg
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/00/911_Tribute_%28perspective_fixed%29.jpg

93 One World Trade Center (photos nn. 66-69):
40.media.tumblr.com/1828a6d8a30c85d8b6445d7521578a88/tumblr_n6mvl8Et9g1qj07nno2_500.jpg
www.vosizneias.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/World-Trade-Center_sham.jpg
cdn.timesofisrael.com/uploads/2013/09/Sept-11-Museum_Horo-2.jpg
d.ibtimes.co.uk/en/full/1441017/one-world-trade-center.jpg

94 Not all passengers' revolts are however suicidal: hijackers are not rarely subdued by policemen and civilians on board. Terrorists actually piloting the aircraft are however a very different case.

95 Photos (nn. 70-75): 1.vgc.no/drpublish/images/article/2007/10/31/22447401/1/990/1815705.jpg
i.imgur.com/dzVNUlB.jpg
parazite.pp.fi/madrid/image/index_00034.JPG
angel2840148089.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/1193934880471_atentado11m4.jpg
parazite.pp.fi/madrid/image/index_00030.JPG
images.enca.com/enca/h_00151230.jpg

stations before Atocha) one bomb on train number 21713. The attack was claimed for Al Qaida on 13 March by Abu Dujan al Afgani in a videotape. With its 191 victims is still the deadliest attack in Europe in the XXI century – in the November 2015 Paris attacks “only” 130 persons were killed. It was a huge shock even for a country for many years confronted with ETA terrorism – which however had never killed more than 21 people on a single occasion (1987 Hypercor bombing in Barcelona)⁹⁶. A terror act with a symbolic link to 9/11, it was also a successful deterrent in the political elections held that same week – and bringing with political change a new left-wing government withdrawing Spain from Iraq war, the bombs having given even the occasion for wide popular demonstration against government and war (*No al terrorisme, no a la guerra*).

In Mumbai (former known as Bombay), the most populous city in India, on 11 July 2006 seven bombs were blasted within 11 minutes (18:24-18:35) on seven different trains of the same line, the Western line, of the suburban railway⁹⁷. The Western line is about 124 km long, but all bombs exploded in the 34 km section between Dadar and Bhayandar: the first four bombs had exploded between 18:24-18:26, the first two in the 13 km section between Bandra and Andheri, the other two just before or just after this section; the next two bombs had exploded at 18:29 and 18:30 at the two extreme limits of the bombed section, before Bandra, between Matunga Road and Mahim Junction (resp. one and two station before Bandra), and after Borivali (29 km from Dadar, and a major station where the last bomb exploded at 18:35), between Mira Road and Bhayander (two-three station after Borivali, the last also a major station). If we name the blast locations with letters following the trains leaving the city, the order of the blasts was also DCEB; GA; F – the cuts were also inflicted with a geometrical perspective, maximizing segmentation of a quadruple line, to avoid by-passes at the frequent commuting stations. The bombs were pressure cooker bombs, relatively easy to construct⁹⁸ and that may be detonated with every device, even a remote one. Again coordination was vital in this attack and well demonstrated by the perpetrators of this attack, for which in the end were blamed Indian Mujahideen (five sentenced to death, seven to life imprisonment).

Multiple bombings do not imply multiple cells – all bombs exploded in Atocha were loaded from the same commando on different trains in the same station. Pressure cooker bombs are very easy to build and all what the five perpetrators in Mumbai still needed were first class railway passes and a timetable to choose the most convenient trains. In this case the Indian Muslims did not test a technique to be later used in the West, but improved a technique already developed in Madrid – what makes even more disquieting these episodes is the sequence Madrid (2004), London (2005), Mumbai (2006).

In London, for the 7/7 attack, the more simple, effective and costly technique of suicide bombers was used – to bomb the city the very next day they had gotten Olympia 2012, and

96 Photos of commemoration (nn. 76-77):
3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/euobs-media/41e2b243224e790b54c1dc9cf7e0cf17.jpg
3.bp.blogspot.com/-2DwQd6evZjE/T1xw7MKOSPI/AAAAAAAAAMdI/QZ0hL5QO-Zg/s1600/P3260031_2.JPG

97 Photos (nn. 78-81): i.ytimg.com/vi/aWmYYcAVa8g/maxresdefault.jpg
s1.dmcnd.net/OfVcV/1280x720-NYI.jpg
specials.rediff.com/news/2006/jul/11mahim5.jpg
newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42148000/jpg/_42148168_forensic_203afp.jpg

98 Later (2010) Al-Qaeda's magazine Inspire published *Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom*, step-by-step instructions for making pressure cooker bombs – so the terrorists learned the technique used to bomb the Boston marathon.

prove that whatever city would have obtained the games, it would have been bombed the very next day: and also put a shadow of threat and fear on the coming games.⁹⁹

The disruption of normal life is however the main thread of all these bombings: in every great city millions of persons use train and metro every day in the rush hour; to make them the target of war acts, to bomb them, is to disrupt their sense of peace and surety. In this perspective New York avoided in 2009 a coordinated attack to his metro subway through the arrest of Najibullah Zazi, an al-Qaeda terrorist, his father and a Queens, New York based imam, Ahmad Wais Afzali.¹⁰⁰

6.3. *Lonewolves: Beltway sniper (2002) and Rigby's beheading (2013)*

The inclusion of a lone-wolf might appear problematic only for counter-terrorism experts, preoccupied to fight against organized terrorists – but lone-wolves are an important part of ideological violence, and so also of religiously motivated violence, and their extremely high motivation may be bring them to extremely lethal results, both if they rationally choose to premeditatedly go amok (as Odinist and counter-jihadist Anders Behring Breivik¹⁰¹, killing however 69 Norwegian socialist youth, or Nidal Hasan, the mad Muslim psychiatrist¹⁰² perpetrating the Fort Hood shooting¹⁰³) or plan much more rationally their activity as serial killers.

The success of the Beltway sniper, measured as the fear/panic in the general population as well as his impact on successive fiction¹⁰⁴, is linked to the extreme rarity of indiscriminate killing among usual serial killers, seeking their abnormal psychological gratification – and who in any case are (fortunately) much less present in the real world than in TV fiction.¹⁰⁵ A sniper is a warrior – and a very skilled, legitimate one in warfare. The year after 9/11 Americans daily experienced war through random killing of civil population by an enemy sniper: doubly illegitimate, not only because he wore no uniform / was no part of an official army, but even much more because killing civilians violates any recognized rules of engagement. Collateral damages may occur and are always highly deprecated, but intentional killing of civilians is never the work of soldiers: soldiers kill somewhat legitimately soldiers, criminals murder civilians. But usually with an immoral, but somewhat rational motive. Terrorists on a suicidal mission to kill indiscriminately everyone, every civilian as their religious enemy, is a monstrous novelty and a terrifying perspective.

This was the Beltway sniper's nightmare, a new terrifying blurring of lines separating war and peace, the year after 9/11. Before the sniper's activity concentrated in the Washington metropolitan area, killing, mostly in Maryland and Virginia, in October 2002 ten persons in fifteen attacks¹⁰⁶, he prepared himself by killing other seven people in preliminary attacks

⁹⁹ *Britain on high alert during Olympics with terror threat classified as 'severe'*, Daily Mail 12-7-2011.

¹⁰⁰ www.scribd.com/doc/34015961/Indictment-Alleged-al-Qaeda-subway-plot

¹⁰¹ www.vl.no/nyhet/breivik-jeg-er-ikke-kristen-1.465538

¹⁰² The Mad psychiatrist is a successful literary or fictional paradigm, without any reality ground: G. Walters, *The stereotype of the mad psychiatrist*, Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 23 (4), 1989, 547-554.

Among serial killers nurses are somewhat represented, doctors very rare: Harold Shipman, active 1975-1988, later nicknamed Doctor Death; Louay Omar Mohammed al-Taei, an Iraqi insurgent killing 2005-2006 wounded policemen and soldiers he should have healed; Marcel Petiot, active 1926-1944; Maxim Petrov, active 2000-2002; Michale Swango, active 1981-1997.

¹⁰³ *Fort Hood shooting: gunman shouted 'Allahu Akbar' before opening fire*, Telegraph 6-11-2009.

¹⁰⁴ Almost every police series had in the following years its mad sniper, randomly killing people.

¹⁰⁵ Less than 1% of all murders are perpetrated in USA by serial killers.

¹⁰⁶ Photos (nn. 143-144): cdn4.static.ovimg.com/m/0q0m6/?width=1200
3.bp.blogspot.com/_03cCfAQdwek/SuBsszOxNzI/AAAAAAAAABLY/23B5G-R5JSk/s320/sniper-v.jpg

in a wider area (from Tacoma to Tucson, from Louisiana to Maryland and Alabama). In the end phase of his activity he killed

- on 2 October 2002 at 18:30 James Martin in the parking lot of a grocery store in Wheaton, Maryland;
- on 3 October at 7:41 James Buchanan, mowing grass at a commercial centre near Rockville, at 8:12 Premkumar Walekar, a taxi driver of Indian descent, pumping gasoline at Aspen Hill, at 8:37 Sarah Ramos, a babysitter, who had just gotten off a bus and was seated on a bench, in Norbeck, at 9:58 Lori Ann Lewis-Rivera, a woman vacuuming her caravan at a station in Kensington: four randomly chosen victims, all murdered, as Martin the preceding evening, in Montgomery county, Maryland;
- on the same day at 21:20 Pascal Charlot, a *black* old man, and the only victim killed on federal soil in Washington while peacefully walking in the street;
- on 9 October at 20:18 Harold Meyers, pumping gasoline near Manassas, Virginia, – after wounding only Caroline Seawell loading her minivan at a mall in Spotsylvania country in Virginia (4 October at 14:30) and Iran Brown, a 13-years old boy, in front of his school in Bowie, Maryland (7 October at 8:09);
- on 11 October at 9:30 Kenneth Bridges pumping fuel in Spotsylvania country in Virginia;
- on 14 October at 21:15 Linda Franklin, a FBI analyst after her shopping in Fairfax county, Virginia;
- on 19 October at 20:00 Jeffrey Hopper in a parking lot near a steakhouse on state route 54 in Ashland, Virginia – after gas station had begun to protect their client with tarps;
- on 22 October at 5:56 a black bus driver, Conrad Johnson, standing on the steps of his bus in Aspen Hill, Maryland.

On 24 October the sniper, John Allen Muhammad, and his underage helper, Lee Boyd Malvo, were arrested – later found guilty of all the shooting they were sentenced, Muhammad to death (and executed on 10 November 2009), Malvo to six consecutive life terms without parole. While their revolutionary plans (phase two) were largely dramatic and fictional, their preparation of phase one, largely unaccomplished (as Muhammed did not reach, or even approach, his target of six white killed every day for 30 days – and two of them were black, one of Indian descent) had military quality – they reconnoitred the places, prepared their retreat, planned accurately every killing, without knowing who will be killed for being at the wrong time in the wrong place, for falling into their trap.

In any case in 2013¹⁰⁷, in the first terrorist murder on British land since the 7/7 suicide bombings of 2005 in London, a British soldier, Lee Rigby, was attacked and beheaded in London in front of dozens of witnesses by two Islamist terrorists on 22 May¹⁰⁸. One of the killers, probably a British-born Muslim convert, speaking with a London accent with his hands dripping with blood, said:

We swear by almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone. Your people will never be safe. The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are dying by British soldiers every day. We must fight them as they fight us. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. I apologise that women had to

¹⁰⁷ We reprint here, with minimal alterations, what already observed in our *Religious historical observatory* 2013, Charleston 2014, 181-183.

¹⁰⁸ Photos (nn. 145-146): ombl.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/945555_376866439086812_942487082_n.jpg upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Lee_Rigby_Manchester_tribute.jpg

witness this today but in our lands our women have to see the same. You people will never be safe. Remove your government, they don't care about you. Do you think David Cameron is going to get caught in the street when we start busting our guns? Do you think your politicians are going to die? No, it's going to be the average guy like you, and your children. So get rid of them. Tell them to bring our troops back so we, so you can all live in peace.

Only wounded by the police, the two attackers were apprehended and on 19 December found guilty, later (19 February 2014) sentenced to life imprisonment. During sentencing, as the judge was telling the defendants

You were radicalised and each became an extremist - espousing a cause and views which, as has been said elsewhere, are a betrayal of Islam and of the peaceful Muslim communities who give so much to our country Adebowale (the one who was to get a mitigated sentence, leaving some prospect of rehabilitation) shouted

It's a lie! ... It's not a betrayal of Islam! You and America will never be safe what technically happens to be correct – although most Muslims are peaceful and do not even support mujaheddin with their own zakat, Islamist terrorists do apply both letter and spirit of the Qur'an. When one is religiously taught to *fight those who do not believe in Allah* (9,29), *slay the idolaters wherever you find them* (9,5), *smite the necks of those who disbelieve until when you have overcome them* (47,4) is very difficult to distinguish his own personal "barbaric murder" from the barbaric holy war they adhered – to become the civilized, peace-teaching book most theologians dream of, the Qur'an should be radically amended and objurgated, what no Islamic theologian ever thinks to do. His actual verses, plainly read, do positively incite to hate crime and barbaric holy war to impose Islamic religious supremacy.

To confirm a not accidental relationship between Islam and religious violence, two sentences were issued on Muslims who glorified the Woolwich attacks: Deyka Ayan Hassan, who sent a tweet saying that people wearing (as Rigby did) Help for Heroes T-shirts "deserved to be beheaded" was sentenced to 250 hours of unpaid work, a Muslim couple was sentenced resp. to 5 years 4 months and 20 months, for posting three video glorifying the Woolwich attacks. Later (12 June 2013) the husband had also offered on Facebook a reward for randomly avenging the rape of an Iraqi woman:

Any1 who kills an invading soldier in Muslim land I will give them a Vauxhall Astra 3door and money (French British American any kaffir soldier take ur pick).¹⁰⁹

The real Qur'an also not only teaches extremists to kill, but creates a broader public of followers, who approve and exalt their barbaric murders – when they do not copy them, as three days later in a copycat attack in the Paris suburb of La Défense, where a French soldier was attacked and stabbed by a man. And at a more serious level the British Muslim activist Anjem Choudary refused to condemn the attack, in terms that appeared to justify it, and stated than most Muslims cannot disagree with what Adebolajo said in his clip and explains what he did.

6.4. Mumbai (2008) and Paris (2015)

The attack on Charlie Hebdo had a terrible impact on the Western world, because it destroyed another invisible barrier: not even after the threats against the Danish cartoonists and two attempted murders of Kurt Westergaard, we might have feared the killing not of a single journalist, but of a whole journal, even if a small one. The Charlie Hebdo shooting on 7 January 2015 showed how a whole newspaper may be easily killed by a skilled commando of only two professional soldiers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, who fortunately were killed two days later at the end of a double *and coordinated* hostage crisis (also a disquieting

¹⁰⁹ Woolwich attack: Student sentenced for 'joke' tweet, BBC News 7-6-2013; British Muslim who knew one of Lee Rigby's killers admits posting YouTube videos glorifying the murder, Guardian 12-2-2014.

novum), with Kouachis sieged in Dammartin-en-Goële (Ile de France) and Amedy Coulibaly with his hostages in a kosher superette in Porte de Vincennes (Paris XX) – this anti-Semitic side of the story, here not examined, should not however be forgotten...

On 7 January 2015 at 11:30 two brothers, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, belonging to Al-Qaeda's branch in Yemen, entered the offices of Charlie Hebdo¹¹⁰, a satirical weekly magazine which had successfully faced criminal proceedings sued (2007) by the Grand Mosque of Paris, the Muslim World League and the Union of French Islamic Organisations over their own cartoons added to the republication of the Danish ones – with Cabu's cover showing Muhammad complaining *C'est due d'être aimé par des cons...*¹¹¹

les limites admissibles de la liberté d'expression n'ont pas été dépassées.

for the French courts, who allow also the republication of the two Danish cartoons specifically blamed by the Muslims, the genial *Stop! We have run out of virgins* and Westergaard's Muhammad with a bomb in his turban.¹¹² Before this trial, during the controversy on the Danish cartoons however Charlie Hebdo had also published an anti-Islamic manifest¹¹³.

Manifeste des douze: "Ensemble contre le nouveau totalitarisme"

Après avoir vaincu le fascisme, le nazisme et le stalinisme, le monde fait face à une nouvelle menace globale de type totalitaire : l'islamisme. Nous, écrivains, journalistes, intellectuels, appelons à la résistance au totalitarisme religieux et à la promotion de la liberté, de l'égalité des chances et de la laïcité pour tous.

Les événements récents, survenus à la suite de la publication de dessins sur Mahomet dans des journaux européens, ont mis en évidence la nécessité de la lutte pour ces valeurs universelles. Cette lutte ne se gagnera pas par les armes, mais sur le terrain des idées. Il ne s'agit pas d'un choc des civilisations ou d'un antagonisme Occident-Orient, mais d'une lutte globale qui oppose les démocrates aux théocrates.

Comme tous les totalitarismes, l'islamisme se nourrit de la peur et de la frustration. Les prédicateurs de haine misent sur ces sentiments pour former les bataillons grâce auxquels ils imposeront un monde encore liberticide et inégalitaire. Mais nous le disons haut et fort : rien, pas même le désespoir, ne justifie de choisir l'obscurantisme, le totalitarisme et la haine. L'islamisme est une idéologie réactionnaire qui tue l'égalité, la liberté et la laïcité partout où il passe. Son succès ne peut aboutir qu'à un monde d'injustices et de domination : celle des hommes sur les femmes et celle des intégristes sur les autres. Nous devons au contraire assurer l'accès aux droits universels aux populations opprimées ou discriminées.

Nous refusons le « relativisme culturel » consistant à accepter que les hommes et les femmes de culture musulmane soient privés du droit à l'égalité, à la liberté et à la laïcité au nom du respect des cultures et des traditions.

Nous refusons de renoncer à l'esprit critique par peur d'encourager l'« islamophobie », concept malheureux qui confond critique de l'islam en tant que religion et stigmatisation des croyants.

Nous plaillons pour l'universalisation de la liberté d'expression, afin que l'esprit critique puisse s'exercer sur tous les continents, envers tous les abus et tous les dogmes. Nous lançons un appel aux démocrates et aux esprits libres de tous les pays pour que notre siècle soit celui de la lumière et non de l'obscurantisme.

¹¹⁰ Photos (nn. 147; 151): thenypost.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/hebdo.jpg
cdn2.spectator.co.uk/files/2012/07/11020.jpg

¹¹¹ Photo (n. 150): i.imgur.com/feWyrDT.jpg

¹¹² Photos (nn. 148-149): reclaimourrepublic.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/islam-run-out-of-virgins.png
www.barenakedislam.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/70387148_protests_getty.jpg

¹¹³ By Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Chahla Chafiq-Beski, Caroline Fourest, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Irshad Manji, Maryam Namazie, Mehdi Mozaffari, Taslima Nasreen, Salman Rushdie, Antoine Sfeir, Philippe Val, Ibn Warraq.

On 7 January¹¹⁴ the Muslim terrorists showed how easy it is nowadays to kill unbelievers in their world, at their home. But the following days showed the other side of the coin, demonstrating that to kill authors defending freedom of speech is the worst way to exert censorship: under the slogan *Je suis Charlie* France protested, compact, against the attacks and for Charlie, for freedom of speech and expression¹¹⁵. Charlie's authors had been killed, but Charlie Hebdo has gained popularity and consent, a wider circulation and a much more solid financial basis: its potential is not unlimited, its popularity might with the time downsize again, but the satirical weekly magazine leaped from 45000 copies sold in 2012 to over 250000 copies sold at the end of 2015, with 210000 subscribers, and sold 8 million copies of his first number after the attacks, with Luz' famous cover with Mohammad's recantation *Je suis Charlie*.¹¹⁶ At the same time all European newspapers, but the British ones, broke their precedent caution and published Islamic cartoons – as an homage to Charlie, giving the dead, not the killers the last and final word on the long controversy.

Even more important, Charlie had become a symbol¹¹⁷, around which a cartoonist movement arose in defence both of their profession and freedom of speech as a fundamental Western value: we have chosen, both in homage to Charlie's price for freedom of speech and even more to correctly exert our profession of historian, to document both the homage to Charlie¹¹⁸ and the cartoonists' on-going satirical treatment of Islam¹¹⁹.

The price of this European pride and defence of freedom would have been paid, as we see later, with the second attack against Paris – leading the government to declare the state of emergency and invoke, for the first time ever, military support from the European Union, almost accepting a war declaration by ISIL, bombed two days later within operation Chammal on its site in Al-Raqqah. Before following this obvious thread, we must however discuss another less obvious and more important thread backwards, to the 2008 Mumbai shootings, as the technical turn from multiple bombings to multiple shootings, introduced in

114 Photo (n. 152): i.huffpost.com/gen/2462108/images/o-ATTENTAT-CHARLIE-HEBDO-facebook.jpg.

115 Photos (nn. 153-159):

i.huffpost.com/gen/2532820/images/o-CHARLIE-HEBDO-MARCH-FRANCE-facebook.jpg

pix.avaxnews.com/avaxnews/c8/db/0001dbc8_big.jpeg

media22.elsiglodurango.com.mx/i/2015/01/411683.jpeg

upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/06/Je_suis_Charlie,_Paris_11_January_2015.jpg

cdn0.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/2912864/461129350.0.jpg

s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/2015/01/12/parisrally.jpg

www.kazak.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/worstact.jpg

116 Photos (nn. 160- 161): www.katproxy.al/yuqme/users/20/078/L5hWyBI0u7.png

d1.yimg.com/sr/imgv1/1/cd2539af-3f20-3c6d-8e84-8194c333cbac

117 Photo (n. 162):

cdn-europe1.new2.ladmedia.fr/var/europe1/storage/images/europe1/technologies/le-carton-de-l-application-je-suis-charlie-709896/14166394-1-fre-FR/Le-carton-de-l-application-Je-Suis-Charlie.jpg

118 Photos (nn. 163-169): www.bdfugue.com/media/blog/charlie-hebdo/lucille-clerc.jpg

cajac1845.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/081.jpg

pbs.twimg.com/media/B6xRszRCMAEZGBn.jpg:large

i.imgur.com/14zTiH8.jpg

padresteve.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/david-pope.jpg

i.imgur.com/b06nptd.jpg

wpmedia.montrealgazette.com/2015/01/nono.jpg

119 Photos (nn. 170-173): www.updateordie.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/DarrinBell.jpg

pbs.twimg.com/media/B6y-L-GCYAA4xYh.jpg

www.updateordie.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ShreyasNavare.jpg

batona.net/uploads/posts/2015-01/1420989731_021.jpg

Europe with the Paris attacks of January 2015 (not only to Charlie Hebdo, but also to a Jewish kosher supermarket) and then in greater scale in November¹²⁰.

Suicide shooters kill probably not so many people as suicide bombers – but they better reach qualified targets and perhaps bring more realistically war into pacific countries.

In any case on 21 November ten terrorists leave Karachi heavily armed (each with his Kalashnikov, 6-7 magazines with 30 rounds each, plus other 400 round and eight hand grenades); they hijack a fishing trawler, sail to India, and with inflatable speedboats land on 26 November in Mumbai.

The main attacks began on 26 November at 21:20 when two terrorists entered the passenger hall of the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway station¹²¹, opened fire and threw grenades, killing 52 people and wounding 109; then they proceeded against Cama Hospital, opened fire but were intercepted by policemen, killing one of them and arresting the other.

At 23:00 four terrorists entered the Taj Mahal Hotel¹²², were surrounded about midnight by the police, at 1:00 a massive blast leading to a fire occurred in the building, people were evacuated by firemen while police tried to take control of terrorists, who had moved, before 4:30, into another tower with 100-150 hostages. Police began storming the hotel and freeing / evacuating hostages and a gun battle developed about 10:30; in the afternoon (16:30) terrorists set fire to the 4th floor. The next day several rounds of grenade explosions occurred (14:53-15:59) while the first bodies were recovered; after a last round of explosions on 29 November (3:40-4:10) the Taj Mahal Hotel was again under government control – but a last gun battle took place about 7:30.

Two terrorists controlled the Oberoi Trident from the night of 26 November; the governmental troops began storming the hotel at 6:00 the next morning, but the main battle was fought, after the first hostages were already rescued, with the Sikh reinforcements at about 17:35; later however explosions occurred (18:45) and a fire broke on 4th floor: when every combat ceased, at about 15:00 of 28 November, 24 bodies were recovered, 143 hostages rescued – the perpetrators were obviously dead, but not unsuccessfully in their perverted perspective.

Two other terrorists had attacked the same night Nariman House (or Chabad House), a five-story Jewish outreach centre, opened in 2003 by newly married Rabbi Gavriel and Rivka Holtzberg; after a first cross-firing (on 27 at about 11:00), a naval helicopter took an aerial survey (17:30) allowing to rescue (about midnight) 9 hostages from the first floor; the main operation took place on 28, but the commandos, who killed both terrorists in a fierce gun battle, found all 6 hostages, including the rabbi and his wife, tortured and murdered by the terrorists (their son had however been rescued by his Indian nanny).

The terrorist attacks to Paris on 13 November 2015 combined coordinated shootings and coordinated bombings: the death toll would have been by far greater, if the suicide bombings had not completely failed their goal, to bomb the stadium during a football

¹²⁰ When it was observed “a level of sophistication we really haven't seen in an urban area since 2008 in the attack in Mumbai, India”: R. Engel – J. Schuppe, *Paris attacks: ISIS supporters celebrate, but who's to blame?*, NBC News 14-11-2015.

¹²¹ Photos (nn. 85-88): www.afinance.cn/new/UploadFiles_2266/200811/20081128102725828.jpg
md1.libe.com/photo/17268-india-mumbai.jpg
ocdn.eu/images/pulscms/ZDE7MDA_/e6afb87d7d5b6d9fa89e8bd4ec75fe4.jpg
www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/18/david-headley-mumbai-attacks-pakistan

¹²² Photos (nn. 82-84): static01.nyt.com/images/2008/11/29/world/29mumbai_600a.JPG
news24-d50.kxcdn.com/media/uploads/2015/11/18/2008-mumbai-attacks.JPG
www.kansanuutiset.fi/images/1713591.jpg

match (France-Germany) and then bomb the panicking mob fleeing the stadium – what surely reminds of the Boston marathon bombing, where this scenario was aimed but did not take place... Prevented from entering the stadium by a security guard, the first perpetrator killed only himself and a bystander (21:20), the other bombers followed him in his lonely suicide at 21:30 and 21:53 – without killing anybody else, because the expected evacuation had not taken place: to avoid panic, which in mass events is more lethal than the threat itself, the match was not cancelled, coaches were informed of the situation, public and players not. The German foreign minister remained at the stadium, while the French premier left it at half-time to coordinate with his interior minister the response to the emergency; the German footballers did not return to their hotel, where there had been a bomb threat, but slept in the stadium, together with their French colleagues, who stayed to display solidarity. At the end of the match the speaker announced some problems and ordered a disciplined evacuation – but the public preferred to invade the pitch. Half of the plan failed miserably – but indirectly succeeded, in the cancellation of Germany-Netherlands and Belgium-Spain in the very next days, while demonstratively William of Cambridge (the second heir apparent) attended England-France on 17 November and Euro 2016 will be presumably still held in France.¹²³

A second group of three terrorists on board of a black Belgian SEAT opened fire on people sitting at the outdoor terrace of three groups of restaurants in the X arrondissement (nn. 2-3; 5 on the map in the photo n. 176¹²⁴), killing altogether 39 people, before one of them detonated himself, without killing anyone else, in the Comptoir Voltaire care (n. 6). More specifically:

- at 21:25 fifteen persons were killed by terrorists, shooting people outside Le Carillon and inside the restaurant Le Petit Cambodge, on the other side of the street, while shouting Allahu Akbar;
- at 21:32 five people were killed outside Café Bonne Bière, a brasserie, by a gunman with a Kalashnikov;
- at 21:36 19 people, including the Muslim wife of its Jew owner¹²⁵, were killed in a longer attack by two gunmen against the outdoor terrace of the restaurant La Belle Équipe.¹²⁶

The main toll death came however from the mass shooting and hostage seizing at the Bataclan theatre, where about 1500 people were listening the Eagles of Death Metal; at about 21:40 four dark-clad men, shouting Allahu Akbar, opened fire on the audience: the band escaped without injury, many survivors escaped via the emergency exit into the street, or refuged on the roof or in toilets and offices. 60-100 persons were taken hostages at about 22:00, when the police gathered and sieged the theatre: specialized units came at 22:15, the theatre was stormed in three minutes at 00:20, and 89 victims were counted: three attackers blew up themselves, the fourth was shot dead by the police¹²⁷. In some sense it is a repeti-

¹²³ Photos (nn. 174-175): www.nividar.com/full/9ae932b290b9a81390b3888334ddc6f088e6f507.jpg
i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2015/11/17/20/2E8AB03E00000578-3322698-image-a-38_1447792485880.jpg

¹²⁴ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_2015_Paris_attacks

¹²⁵ P. Zonszain, *Attentats de Paris : le patron juif de La Belle Equipe pleure sa femme musulmane*, Actualité Juive 17-11-2015.

¹²⁶ Photos (nn. 177-179): cdn2.img.sputniknews.com/images/103007/05/1030070553.jpg
img.bfmtv.com/i/0/0/e5b/22199ebce7685df70e4fd64555ded.jpg
www.leoaffairs.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/GetStory5.jpg

¹²⁷ Photos (nn.180-182; 193): <http://joeforamerica.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/15-1124-Paris.jpg>
img.thesun.co.uk/aidemitlum/archive/02568/01_19102110_bd4396_2568555a.jpg

tion of the Moscow theatre incident (2002) – with much fewer attackers (4 instead of 40!), the same toll death, a much shorter crisis and no polemics on friendly damages through the use of gas. A professional, very qualified answer could not prevent a heavy toll death, already paid *before* a rapid and successful intervention of the hostage crisis.

France mourned spontaneously on the sites¹²⁸, then officially for three days, with much public, spontaneous prayer (suggested in the social media with the hashtag #PrayForParis, which goes viral much quicker than #JeSuisCharlie¹²⁹), the victims will be declared *morts pour la France*, as usually are civil servants or military personal dead in service, their children *pupilles de la nation* – what guarantees, since resp. 1915/1922 and 1917, state aid. French mourning became however also an international dimension, with wide, mostly spontaneous participation everywhere¹³⁰ –and many monuments symbolically wearing the French colours at night.¹³¹ Under the slogan *Je suis en terrasse* Paris later declared its will not be scared and deprived of its normal life and *orgueil*.¹³²

On 20 November the French parliament approved the extension of *l'état d'urgence*, already declared by the premier during the events, for three months, from 26 November 2015 to 26 February 2016 – and was renewed in February for further three months – it had been used, after the Algerian crisis, only once in France *métropolitaine* in 2005. The French premier envisaged also to extend denaturalization of dual citizens for terrorism also to dual citizen born French, because born in France – something already vehemently requested by the far right. He invoked also, the first one to do so after the signature of the Treaty on European Union (1992), its article 42 comma 7:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

As after 9/11, but yet differently, a war act was acknowledged as such and a declaration of war¹³³ accepted and reciprocated – in the name of Europe.

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www.thestar.com/content/dam/thestar/news/world/2015/11/14/paris-attack-survivors-recount-bataclan-slaughter/bataclan.jpg

septclues.com/BATACLAN%20PARIS%202013NOV2015/Vicsims_Bataclan_FULL.JPG

¹²⁸ Photos (nn. 183-186; 188):

1.mshcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-Mashable-Photos-of-the-Year-59.jpg

il.wp.com/wpcluster.dctdigital.com/eveningexpress/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/11/tributes1.jpg

img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AAfFTD5.img

america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/photo-gallery/2015/11/photos-paris-mourns-victims-of-attacks.html

timedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/eiffel-tower-paris-attacks.jpg

¹²⁹ Both produced about 6.7 million tweets, however #PrayForParis in only ten hours instead of five days: what may however have very different explanations (including the pre-existence of #JeSuisCharlie...)

¹³⁰ Photos (nn. 187; 189):

www.bostonglobe.com/news/bigpicture/2015/11/16/paris-attacks/YxPpKPkxoR4hjjivIssYL/story.html

metrouk2.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/ad188060359people-observe-a.jpg

¹³¹ Photo (n.190): ic.pics.livejournal.com/mi3ch/983718/6540576/6540576_original.jpg

¹³² Photo (n.191): i.huffpost.com/gen/3742560/images/o-BONNE-BIERE-facebook.jpg

¹³³ See the claim of the attack in an internet posting, exactly reproduced in photo n. 192: gaelle.hautetfort.com/media/01/00/2095507937.png